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ABSTRACT

Education in America today is dominated by the either/or thinking of modernism.
This mode of thought is connected to both the concepts and methods of modern,
mechanistic, Newtonian science. However, the attendant reductionistic methodology has
been elevated beyond its realm of efficacy to the level of a world view, a metaphysical level.
This is demonstrated by the omnipresence of the machine metaphor in all areas of human
endeavor. The machine is the root metaphor of modernism
John Dewey speaks of a “new order of conceptions” necessary for significant change.
These new order concepts are manifest in the new or postmodern sciences. Classical science
focuses on cause/effect, linear relationships and determinate order; whereas, postmodern
science includes the indeterminacy principle and non-linear relationships. Either/or thinking
is a narrow conceptualization of modern science. What I refer to as both/and thinking
incorporates concepts from both classical and quantum physics, modem and postmodern
science and recognizes they cannot be reduced one to the other — both are essential.
Both/and thinking is needed to understand Dewey’s concepts for reconstructing education.
Metaphor is considered both a figure of speech and a mode of thought. Metaphorical
thought serves as a vehicle for moving from the unknown to the known. It is pivotal in
both/and thinking; metaphors are themselves irreducible, yet can lead to areas of precise
inquiry. A postmodern metaphor for a theory of education is offered in order to present
concepts that go beyond those comparing humans with machines. The interrelatedness of
metaphor to theory and theory to practice are discussed. Practical applications conclude the
work.

vi

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Life is a self-renewing process.... ‘Life’ covers customs, institutions, beliefs,
victories and defeats, recreations and occupations....Continuity of life means
continual readaptation....Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of
this social continuity of life.
(Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 2)
To learn to be human is to develop through the give-and-take of
communication an effective sense of being an individually distinctive member
of a community.
(Dewey, 1939, p. 389)
The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed...as the
necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation of
the values that regulate the living o f [humans] together: which is necessary
from the standpoint o f both the general social welfare and the fall
development o f human beings as individuals.
(Dewey, 1939, p. 400)
Life, education, democracy, community and becoming fully human are the themes
that run through these three quotations by John Dewey. These themes and the concepts they
embody emerge from, and are examples of, Dewey’s fundamentally non-dualistic world
view. This is a philosophy that contrasts sharply with the dualisms in the world view of
modernism that dominates educational experience in America today. These five themes and
concepts o f life, education, democracy, community and becoming fully human form the
supporting pillars for the reconstruction o f educational experience advanced in this
dissertation. Non-dualism is the cornerstone o f the foundational world view upon which it
is built.
The world view known as modernism will be explained in greater detail in Chapter
Two, but the central point I find problematic and upon which I focus is dualism. The
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dualisms inherent in modernism are frequently tied to the Cartesian split or mind-body
problem, whereby Descartes expressed the idea that we have a mind and a body with no
common characteristics in terms of which they can be understood to be intelligibly related —
one visible, the other invisible. The impact of Descartes’ questioning of the separation of
mind and body is such that it has become one of the central issues in Western philosophy
for the last three hundred years. Another aspect of the Cartesian legacy expands well beyond
this philosophical debate. Descartes’ rational method o f questioning, merging with Bacon’s
empiricism has over the intervening centuries evolved into the scientific method. When one
takes the philosophical dualisms associated with, and/or emerging from, the mind-body split
and links them to a narrow use of the scientific method, what I refer to as either/or thinking
emerges.
The crux of my argument is the necessity of both/and thinking. By both/and thinking
I mean the use o f all forms o f thought, both analysis and synthesis, and narrative, and
metaphor and logic a n d .... This is essential for adequate understanding rather than merely
gaining facts about something. Ways of thinking will be discussed in detail in Chapters One,
Two, and Three; however, some groundwork for those chapters will be helpful.
An example to point out distinctions between what I mean by either/or thinking and
both/and thinking is how a table is perceived. Using either/or thinking, a table is viewed as
only an object. It can be described. It is made o f wood, with metal screws that secure the
legs to the top. As an object it is important because it has one or more functions. If it is a
dining table, then its primary function is its use for meals. It may also be beautiful, but this

too is a function o f its existence as an object. It has no significance beyond what it is in
itself.
Both/and thinking views the table both as an object in itself and as a member in a
variety of relationships. The trees cut for wood, the rain and sun that helped the trees grow,
the carpenter, the ore from which the screws were made, the ancestors o f the carpenter are
all related to the existence o f the table. If any one is removed, the table would not exist. In
other words, the table is understood to be both constituted as an object made of wood and
screws that functions in certain ways and constituted by the interconnected, indirect
relationships that also made its existence possible. In both/and thinking, indirect, subtle
relations are necessary and important to consider. They may not be o f central focus, but
must never be excluded.
Thinking o f a table as merely an object may not seem troublesome; however, the
mode o f thought it exemplifies is problematic. We need an understanding of relatedness,
connections between and among things. Bowers and Flinders state this in terms of the need
to think ecologically because an ecology is “a system of interdependent relations” (1990, p.
234). A biology teacher at a college preparatory school related a common phenomenon
among his freshmen students. He said they frequently do not understand the main ingredient
in a fast food chicken sandwich comes from a feathered bird raised on a farm! They do not
make the connection between chickt as a bird and chicken in a sandwich. Those are simply
two separate, discrete objects they have no reason to connect. Their concepts are atomistic
rather than ecological.

Either/or thinking is illustrated in various ways in all the disciplines. That there ar§
separate, discrete disciplines is one aspect of either/or thinking. Areas of study are separated
into independent categories —the discipline is either science or art, history or literature,
English or math. The reader might respond at this point, “Well, isn’t it?” A major
recommendation of this dissertation is that we re-frame this question, and others framed in
a similarly closed manner and replace them with open questions. Such questions would
allow for the discovery of more useful and complete explanations and additional worthwhile
ways of inquiry —ways that lead to still more questions and deeper, broader exploration.
However, returning to the question as asked —no, of course, science isn’t the same as art,
but science isn’t art-fess either. Science, at its best, is artful. History is reduced to a list of
isolated facts without literature, a story to help us interpret those facts, to bind them
together.
What I demonstrate as problematic is the domination of either/or thinking, not that
all opposites or dichotomies should be eliminated. In psychology the problematic aspect of
either/or thinking manifests as the familiar nature vs. nurture question. This debate has two
distinct sides whereby humans are understood to be controlled by either nature or nurture.
Thus framed, the either/or argument has no room for the role of interaction between nature
and nurture nor does it consider the context, in which these interactions play out, to be
significant.
Either/or thinking is less prevalent in psychology today, the nature/nurture
dichotomy is in disrepute, but either/or dualisms are still rampant in education as well as
everyday life. One of the most commonly voiced calls for educational reform, frequently

seen in the media, is a plea to add more days to the school year or to give students more
homework. This idea may at first seem unrelated but is based on the either/or concept that
holds that more is necessarily better; more days, more homework, more ... will fix whatever
problems exist. This idea functions as a logical premise by assuming all problems in life,
including educational ones, are arithmetic problems -- more or less o f something is the
answer. This is problematic in two ways. First, the major premise can be stated: All school
days are educational. In order for the argument to be sound, all premises must be true.
However, there is no evidence that this is a true premise. What is this premise based upon?
Where is the reflection on what constitutes school day experiences? Likewise homework
could be substituted for school days, and the truth of that premise needs the same
exploration.
The second problem is that the method is inappropriate. A syllogism is a form of
logic that is a closed, self-contained system which Dewey points out is problematic because
it “does not provide for the function of invention .... there is no means o f getting knowledge
that is not already recorded ... no provision for moving from the known to the unknown”
(1984, p. 62). In other words, what is viewed as the problem and its solution are stated at
the same time. This type of thinking cannot be used for problem solving. Problem solving
requires a mode of thought that moves us from the known to the unknown. If an answer is
already known then there is no problem. Dewey’s method o f inquiry is open, allowing for
exploration into the uncertainties of a problem.
Either/or thinking, as stated earlier, can be connected to the scientific method
whereby a topic under examination is necessarily separated out for examination. This

isolation is part of reductionist methodology. There are many aspects of life where focus on
precision, narrowing of possibilities for very specific puiposes is important. As such, it is a
necessary, indispensable mode of thought. Modem technology would not exist without it.
But reductionism as a methodology is only one aspect o f the scientific method which
employs other modes of thought as well. When used alone, as a dominating mode of
thought, it becomes limiting.
Both/and thinking encompasses the need for either/or thought but rejects the
possibility of its universal applicability. When used in isolation without reflection, either/or
thinking can exemplify a dehumanizing extreme. This is not readily noticeable when referring
to a table; however, when this same objectification is applied to people the implications are
enormous. An individual suffering from the effects of a heart attack, can be reduced to “the
coronary in room 610,” or to a student, viewed not as John Smith, a young boy who
engages in particular inappropriate or troublesome behaviors, but as “a behavior problem.”
Either/or thinking focuses on things rather than relationships as fundamental. Things
can be separated, categorized, and as Dewey says put into “pigeon-holes.” This is an
extension of Aristotle’s classification system taken to an extreme, whereby the object, table,
is seen only as a member of the class, table; similarity, a person can be viewed as an object,
only a member of a class —a black, a white, a female. Both/and thinking sees relationships
as fundamental. This means that relationships can never be ignored or eliminated —nor are
objects, diseases or conditions ignored. Rather they are understood as existing within the
greater context of relations, not merely as separate isolatable entities. A hospitalized patient
with malaria is an individual part of society who is suffering from a particular disease in the

context of a social institution, a hospital. All her needs, both directly and indirectly medical,
as well as emotional, financial, etc. are part o f the complex web of interrelatedness forming
the person she is. Who did she come into contact with prior to hospitalization? Who pays
the bill? Is the emotional depression she is currently experiencing connected to the malaria?
Is it a prior condition? Is it related to treatment by hospital staff, financial difficulties, lack
of visitors? Is it one, all, none, several, and/or factors not noted?
Both/and thinking means that focus is placed on the general aspects sometimes and
specific aspects at other times, but both necessarily exist simultaneously and are not
reducible one to the other. I am not either a doctoral student or a wife, a mother or a
counselor. I am all o f those and more, simultaneously. Yet, in particular instances, such as
writing this dissertation, I am acting primarily as a student-scholar. Focus is on the particular
activities that relate to this aspect of my life. Without intense, particular focus, I could not
complete this work. However, I do not cease to be wife, mother, and counselor. Because
these are relationships that help constitute my entire being, to exclude them would be to
alter significantly who I am. I would be only, “a doctoral student,” a member of a
generalized category. But, as such a vacant entity, I could not be effective enough in my role
as a doctoral student to complete the dissertation in a meaningful way. I might complete the
dissertation, but it would lack the rich humanness of life.
An educational example of the difficulty arising from focus on the general category
to the exclusion o f the richness of relations inherent in the particular, occurred recently at
a school with students from Pre-Kindergarten through twelfth grade. The school is
subdivided into three divisions. The Lower School is Pre-K through fifth grade, Middle

8

School is sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the Upper School is grades nine through twelve.
The student body can be classified as a general, whole, with the individual students as (only)
members of that whole. The new Head of the upper division wanted to promote a sense of
unity within the entire student body. He thought that events attended by all students
together would serve that purpose. Since the school has a religious affiliation, he wanted to
add an all-school chapel service before Christmas. (This could equally apply to any type of
school assembly or event promoting unity in any school.)
Two problems arose: how to fit another event into the already filled schedule of the
three divisions, and how to design a single event that is meaningful to four year olds, twelve
year olds, graduating seniors. These problems can be overcome, but not without significant
awareness of the richness of relationships inherent both in these sub-categories and inherent
in the individuals themselves. But the new Head, focusing exclusively on the general
category — an all-school event for the purpose of unity — could not understand those
problems. He simply wanted to pick a time, and have an event. This is either/or thinking —
his focus was exclusively on time and event as either/ors. He did not recognize that unity
is a quality of relationships —among students, faculty, school divisions, traditions, etc. An
all-school event bringing all the students to the same place at the same time is not
necessarily unity. In order to form unity, the event must be a meaningful shared experience.
For the event to have meaning, the multiple needs must be considered. Unity is an emergent
quality of shared meaningful experiences. However, the dualistic thinking o f the new Head
missed this necessity all together.

Dewey’s objections to dualisms and his espousal o f an interactive unity do not go
as far as the concept of fractals —with their recursive self-similarity —which I present in
Chapter Four. However, such a both/and position presages one o f the major distinctions
between the isolating characteristics connected with modem Newtonian science and
Euclidian geometry, on one side, and the recognition o f interrelatedness characteristic of
postmodern science and fractal geometry, on the other. Dewey’s objections and espousals
run deep; they run through his concepts o f life, education, experience, and democracy. A
look at the three quotations which begin this chapter will add some scaffolding to the
foundational ideas already presented.1
“Life is a self-renewing process” (1916/1966, p. 2). This is a strong statement with
metaphysical ramifications, not merely a factual account. This declaration brings with it an
entire view about life. It is a positive, life-affirming statement; one which declares that life
is dynamic and meaningful, filled with possibilities. Life does something; life is good. The
idea that life is, as Victor Frankl puts it, “unconditionally meaningful”(1978), is central to
my view o f the universe and my relationship to it.
Dewey interprets life, that is human life, in an inclusive sense, stating that education
is the means by which the process of social continuity happens. I further understand
education —the educational process, not the institution —to be the process by which we
learn to live life. In other words, life is an educative process in which every aspect is

1 In order to avoid repeating the quotations in their entirety as I explore the densely
packed ideas they contain, I ask the reader to return to the quotes as often as necessary
to keep the connections and explanations coherent. I will repeat partial quotes assuming
the reader will recognize the context.
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educative in some way; educative (or miseducative) in that all experience in some way
influences, shapes, guides, directs, us toward further experience. The heart of the distinction
between educative and miseducative that Dewey makes is based upon the consequences. All
experience is educative in that it engenders some sort of change. However, educative
experiences are those that expand future possibilities, whereas miseducative experiences
narrow and constrict potentials.
In the second quotation, Dewey says that “To learn to be human is to develop
through the give-and-take of communication an effective sense of being an individually
distinct member of a community” (1939, p. 389). This statement is densely packed. Dewey
is saying that becoming human is not a nature or nurture issue. We learn to become human;
humanness is not a given. We are biologically constituted for that possibility, but we need
the context of human relationships to become effectually or fully human. For example, as
humans, we are bom with vocal cords capable of human speech, but it is only as distinct
members of a human community that we learn human language.
In Democracy and Education Dewey explains the give-and-take process of
communication as one “of sharing experience until it becomes a common possession”
(1916/1966, p.9); that is, we share a common knowledge or understanding of something.
Communication is thus part and parcel of the educative process, whether formal or informal.
But Dewey recognizes dangers inherent in the communicative process. He says that, “As
formal teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger o f creating an undesirable
split between the experience gained in more direct associations and what is acquired in
school. This danger was never greater than at the present time, on account o f the rapid

growth in the last few centuries o f knowledge and technical modes of skill” (p. 9). While
technological change was multiplying when he wrote those words in 1915, he could not
have foreseen that today it would be changing at an exponential rate. His warning, valid in
his day, is vastly more applicable and urgent today. Educational experiences in schools
continue to separate students from real life experiences. The experiences within schools are
separated into isolated disciplines that seem to have no connections with each other. How
many high school students have asked me what Algebra has to do with real life or why
would anyone talk about math in religion class, science in English class, or literature in
physics? Bits of information in each class are isolated as well. They are often strung together
like dates on a time-line chart where the only real connection the students make is that by
knowing a numbering system, they can place the isolated facts in chronological order.
Modes o f thought are means o f communication. The thread that connects them all
is metaphor. Metaphor, by which I mean far more than a figure of speech, is perhaps the
heart of both/and thinking. It is not only an object, a part o f speech, but also a web of
relationships, a way of thinking, a means o f making connections. Metaphor is a central
aspect of “sharing an experience until it becomes a common possession.” I explore modes
of thought in Chapters Two, Three and Four; metaphor is the focus of Chapter Three.
Dewey tells us that we learn to be human through educative communication, and
without such, we do not develop our full humanity. He wants us to develop “an effective
sense ofbeing an individually distinctive member o f a community” (1939, p. 389). This ties
directly into what democracy is about. As Dewey says, democracy is not only a form of
government but a way of life, a means of social relationships. It is the epitome o f a social
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relationship which honors both/and thinking because o f its inherent interdependence. Its
interdependence is that the greatest possible development o f the society depends upon its
promotion of the full potential o f all its members, who in turn are responsible for developing
the society to its fullest potential. Either/or thinking undergirds rugged individualism and
communism. In each case, social relations are based on a focus that honors either the
individual or the society without significant regard for the other. Dewey says that democracy
is needed if we are all and each to have the best possible life.
Dewey begins Education and Experience by saying that humankind “likes to think
in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors"
(1938/1963, p. 17). Aboth/and position avoids these extremes and embraces the paradoxical
tensions inherent in and biologically necessary for life. By ‘paradox’ I mean, not a logical
contradiction to be resolved but the simultaneous holding o f opposites —the meaning of
paradox whereby something can be simultaneously understood in more than one sense.
Using this definition of paradox, rather than that of contradiction, life in its infinite
complexity can be understood as inherently paradoxical. For instance, it is said that, “Birth
is the beginning of death” but, it is also said that, ‘Birth is the beginning o f infinite
possibility.” Is life finite or infinite? Either/or thinking encourages us to privilege logic and
single definitions o f words, prodding us to choose one of these statements over the other.
But these statements issue from different dimensions or aspects o f life; it is their ‘bothness’
which gives full meaning to life. To be understood, they must be held in tension. Life is lived
at the boundary or intersection of the two. Focus on the first alone leads to despair. Focus
on the second alone is folly.
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A stronger sense of this paradoxical tension emerges in the new sciences where the
complexity o f the universe is being understood at new levels —“light is both particle and
wave.” Newtonian physics insists it is one or the other. The idea that “I am both free and
determined” is a paradoxical statement in the sense that I am using paradox. As stated
above, one attempt to resolve the oppositional tension in this statement manifested in the
nature vs. nurture debate. Both/and thinking embraces the complexity of metaphor and
enables us to explore and examine multiple relations and interrelationships without the
necessity of reducing the whole to a single point. Metaphors cannot be reduced to a solitary
definition. Logic helps clarify by pointing to the necessity of examining precisely what is
meant when there is more than one definition. As Aristotle put it “one cannot affirm both
‘p’ and ‘not p’ at the same time and in the same sense.” The statements “life is infinite and
life is finite” cannot both be affirmed in the same sense. Both/and thinking encourages us to
take the statement metaphorically where we can examine the possibilities o f understanding
it in multiple ways. Either/or thinking encourages us to simply reduce it to one or the other.
In an effort to develop my thoughts about the problematic o f either/or thinking and
its reductionistic tendencies, I will construct a metaphor —Life as a tapestry. This metaphor
will serve both as a means to explain further the philosophical position out of which I write
and as a practical application o f the importance o f metaphor which I address in Chapter
Four. In particular, I will examine the relationship between either/or thinking and
discontinuities in the tapestry.
The tapestry I wish to examine is that of what is commonly call Western Civilization.
I do not presume to weave that tapestry, just to assert that such a tapestry portrays the story
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of the history of the Occident. All I wish to do here is trace a few threads, woven over the
centuries that connect the development o f thought and philosophy with current modes of
thinking. Western civilization is often erroneously referred to as the continuation of the
Judeo-Christian tradition. I say erroneously because Greek is Occidental and Hebrew is
Oriental. This point is significant because o f the fundamental differences in the primary
modes of thought out of which Greek and Hebrew cultures developed.
The Judaic roots of Christianity are Eastern; however, Greek thought has had a
tremendous impact on Christianity, especially during the second millennium o f it history.
Consistent with the narrative mode o f the oral tradition of the ancient Hebrews, is an
understanding of the paradoxical tension of existence. Narrative and paradoxical tension are
aspects of both/and thinking. The idea that birth could be described as both “the beginning
of death” cmd‘\h.Q beginning of infinite possibility” is readily understood in Eastern thought.
However, the narrative and paradoxical thread of Oriental origin, has been hidden from view
through much of Occidental history.
TAPESTRY
Before constructing the metaphoric tapestry, let us look specifically at what a
tapestry is in order to add efficacy to the metaphor. Every society has developed weaving
quite early in its evolution. Tapestry is a particular type of weaving and is quite ancient,
possibly dating back some five thousand years (Ackerman, 1933). Simple cloth is most often
woven on a loom with the lengthwise, vertical threads, called the warp, attached to a beam
at the top and one or two beams at the bottom. These vertical warp threads form the
foundation. The horizontal, weft (sometimes called woof) threads are then woven in and out

between each warp thread. The warp threads run the length of the cloth from top to bottom,
and the weft threads run the width, from one side to the other. At its most basic, simple
cloth can be woven from a single color and without pattern. Tapestry can be regarded as a
more complex form of simple weaving with increased potential for complexity o f pattern.
At its most complex, tapestry becomes a mirror of civilization (Ackerman, 1933); a pictorial
narrative.
The weaving of tapestry is unique to cloth-making in two important ways. The warp
threads, all the same color, are placed on the loom as in simple cloth making and so are still
foundational. However, there is a difference in how the various colors o f weft threads are
woven in. First, the wefts are compacted to completely cover the warp. The warp and weft
are not seen alternately, as they are on simple cloth. Rather, the warp in a tapestry is
virtually invisible. The foundational and invisible aspects of the warp will have important
metaphoric implications, especially in Chapter Four.
The second difference is that instead o f moving the weft threads all the way across
the loom, each color is drawn back and forth only as far as that color is needed to form the
pattern. Therefore, unless some single color forms the ground all the way across the work,
which would be rare indeed, there are no weft threads that are carried completely across all
the warps. This forms what Ackerman calls “a technical eccentricity peculiar to tapestry”
(1933, p. 303), resulting in horizontal discontinuity. The discontinuity of all the weft threads
creates a structural problem. Structural integrity depends upon a close, tight weave and the
fact that each weft thread needs to be interwoven with the next warp thread. However, the
discontinuity, whereby the weft color turns back on itself, not crossing the next warp, and
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the next weft comes from the opposite direction, stops and turns back on itself, creates a
slit. For instance, if blue weft threads coming across the warp from left to right as part of
a pattern forming water reach the shore, the blue threads turn back toward the left and go
as far as the blue is needed. Perhaps there is tan shore on each side. The tan weft threads
forming each shore will be drawn across, in and out o f the warp until they reach the blue,
then turn back and return the way they came. So on each side of the blue water, there will
be a slit that forms the boundary between blue and tan, water and shore. This happens with
each change of color. This is the tapestry discontinuity. No weft thread goes all the way
across. There are always breaks, gaps, bifurcations.
What becomes significant for the purpose to which I want to put this metaphor is
how the discontinuity is handled. If the slit is very small, it can remain, and even enhance the
pictorial affect. Or it can be sewn from the back with a needle. However, over time the
makeshift nature o f sewing becomes evident because it will not bear up, the added threads
eventually break. Ackerman says “the only real solution must develop in the weaving itself
.... The most complicated but most complete solution is the interlocked weave, in which the
two different colored wefts are looped through each other at the point of contact” (1933,
p. 304). This method removes the slit, making the fabric equally sound throughout and the
intersection, which remains becomes invisible.
One final characteristic of a tapestry is that it is woven from the back —indirectly
so to speak. The weaver must get up from the seat at the loom and go around to the other
side to view what has been woven. This is much like everyday life where we must be
removed from the immediate experience to look back to or reflect on that experience. One
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error often made is forgetting that a part o f reality cannot be understood in isolation, but
only as a part of the whole, a whole in which parts are and are not separated. This sense of
continuity integrated with individuality lies at the heart of Dewey’s concept o f experience
(1916/1966, 1929/1958, and 1938/1963).
LIFE AS TAPESTRY
Life as tapestry can be applied to the multifaceted aspects o f life. Ackerman (1933)
uses the phrase, mirror of civilization as a metaphor to describe the way numerous cultures
have depicted their histories via that form of pictorial narrative. In America today, movies
serve a similar societal function, becoming modem tapestries or pictorial narratives, that tell
stories of individual lives as well as those o f the society and its history. Miles Richardson
says that “In addition to being both biological creatures and economic beings ... we are in
the same fundamental manner, storytellers” (1991, p. 207). As humans, we have a need to
tell our stories; it is through the stories we tell that meanings emerge and the richness o f life
is experienced. Life has beginnings and endings and is interconnected with other parts o f the
social, cultural, cosmic tapestry. Meaning is made as we look at the relation between our
own life story and those of other individuals and societies, now and in the past.
Discontinuities can destroy meaning. Without meaning, we become a society of
individuals with fragmented experiences, distressed by a sense of separation and isolation,
inhabiting a world made o f disparate parts. Dewey says that taken far enough, the division
within the person will produce insanity —a tapestry of holes and disconnected threads. “A
fully integrated personality, on the other hand, exists only when successive experiences are
integrated with one another” (1938/1963, p. 44) like the interweaving o f warp and weft.

Two subtle but important aspects of the tapestry metaphor relate to what in life is
readily seen and what is not so readily seen.2The horizontal weft threads may be understood
as the ‘visible’ aspects of life, the picture constituted by the actions, events, places, people
we ‘see’ in everyday life, in the classroom. The warp threads can represent the mental
‘invisible’ relationship aspects o f life that bind life experiences together but do not have the
same tangible or visible form. The domination o f either/or thinking, with its strong
connections to empiricism which privileges concrete physical experience, tempts us to focus
exclusively on the visible aspects of life, discrediting or dismissing the invisible relational
aspects. However, the warp threads alone are useless and the weft threads alone have
nothing into which they can be woven. Likewise life as a worthwhile and meaningful
endeavor is generated out of the interweaving o f its visible and invisible aspects.
In order to interweave life tapestries with continuities rather than ignoring or
disregarding discontinuities, we return to Dewey. He says, in one of the quotations that
begin this chapter, that education is the means of social continuity o f life. If schooling is part
of education, then story telling, the narrative, the metaphorical all have important roles to
play in schooling and education. Richard Hopkins says, “Our narratives are the means
through which we imagine ourselves into the persons we become.... [Without narrative
opportunities] the materials of schooling are prevented from delivering narrative meanings;
thus they often are not learned; they pass out of consciousness as waste material, undigested
and unintegrated” (1994, p. xvii). We need metaphors because “metaphors are a way of

2 In this instance I use the terms seen or visible to denote both a level of awareness and
that which we know or understand readily through any o f the senses not just sight.

talking about experience” (Gordon, 1978, p. 9). And as Vaught says allow us to find “an
intersection of indeterminacy and determination” (1987, p. 228). Chapters Two, Three, and
Four will explore these threads in our tapestries as modes o f thought. Chapter Five will
magnify some of the hidden threads in Dewey’s views o f experience and Chapter Six will
weave theory into practice, while Chapter Seven will recursively reflect some of my own
teaching stories.

CHAPTER TWO
TWO MODES OF THOUGHT

[HU]MANKIND likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to
formulating its beliefs in terms o f Either-Ors.
(Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 17)
In Actual Minds. Possible Worlds. Jerome Bruner states, “There are two modes of
cognitive functioning, two modes o f thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering
experience, constructing reality” (1986, p. 11), the logico-scientific mode and the narrative
mode. The two modes are distinct, complementary, and irreducible. Yet both are needed in
order to “capture the rich diversity of thought” (p. 11).
Limiting thought to two modes is somewhat problematic. It suggests the dualism of
Descartes’ mind/body split — dividing a person into physical and spiritual. However, as
Capra points out, “Throughout history, it has been recognized that the human mind is
capable of two kinds of knowledge, or two modes o f consciousness, which have been
termed the rational and the intuitive, and have traditionally been associated with science and
religion” (Capra, 1991, p. 26-27). In a very broad, generalizable sense, these two modes
encompass the range of possible thought. The paradigmatic or scientific is precise, logically
dealing with fact. The narrative or intuitive, principally through story, has ample breadth to
encompass the remaining modes of thought.
These two modes serve as a vehicle for discussing various consequences of the ways
in which the West has both divided and fragmented itself. C.P. Snow experiences this split
as a separation into two cultures (Snow, 1969). Science was moving “from being considered
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a central part o f mainstream culture to an isolated specialty” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 186).
During the 19th century, science was still accessible to those with lay interest, not just the
scholar. For example, in Leeds there were six societies for amateurs interested in
microscopy alone (p. xvii). But by the mid-twentieth century, the segregation of science had
become part of the social, cultural fabric o f the West. “Science has become the new voice
o f authority,” (p. 1) an authority that is as little understood or challenged as the ecclesial
authorities of the Inquisition. Somehow the “clarity o f physics came to be expressed in ...
inaccessible mathematical language” (p. 1).
When Bruner speaks o f two modes, he is suggesting that neither mode is superior
nor sufficient. However, as Dewey (1929) maintains, we (Western civilization for the last
three hundred years) have tended to use one extreme, one mode —the scientific, rational,
logical which Bruner identifies as paradigmatic. When Kuhn introduced the term paradigm
into current usage, one which Bruner draws upon, he related it closely to “‘normal science’
[which] is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the world
is like” (1970, p. 5). As Bruner says, “the paradigmatic mode of thinking deals in general
causes, and in their establishment, and makes use of procedures to assure verifiable
reference and to test for empirical truth” (1986, p. 13).
HOW PREVALENT IS OUR USE OF THIS MODE OF THOUGHT?
Doll contends it has been the foundation o f “American intellectual, social, and
educational thought during the first seven or eight decades of this century” (1993, p. 1). For
Donald Schon, who calls it ‘technical rationality,’ it is the dominant epistemology of
professional practice (1983, p. 21). And it is the continuation and development of eighteenth
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century thought which was marked by “the spread to all fields o f human interest of the
method and aims of Newtonian science” (Randall, 1940/1976, p. 389).
This ‘scientific’ paradigm is really scientism —scientific thinking taken to the level
of a controlling metaphysics. As Frankl puts it, “when a scientist who is an expert in the field
o f biology attempts to understand the phenomena of human existence in exclusively
biological terms, he has fallen prey to biologism” (1970, p. 397). And when biology
becomes biologism, science becomes ideology (p. 397).
This paradigmatic mode operates on the principles o f Newtonian science and
Cartesian methodology and uses those fundamental assumptions (Barbour, 1990). These
were and are “assumptions about nature consistent with the certainty of physical laws and
the symbolic power o f machines.... Mechanism substituted a picture o f the natural world,
which seemed to make it more rational, predictable, and thereby manipulable” (Merchant,
1980, p. 227). In summary, these assumptions, which are in turn based on the further
assumption that matter is the basic component of reality, are:
1. All matter is composed of component parts -

Atomism

2. The universe is governed by discoverable laws - Deterministic Order
3. Knowledge (as well as wealth) can be abstracted directly from nature Context-Independence
4. All problems can be broken down into constituent parts and manipulated
variable by variable -

Reductionist Methodology

5. Sensory information comes in discrete units; it is not interconnected Mechanistic
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Using this paradigm, what is true of machines is true of nature and vice versa. Machines can
be controlled and manipulated; their actions are predictable. Machines, says Merchant, are
the “structural models for Western ontology and epistemology” (1980, p. 227). The
deterministic aspects of this paradigm are so dominant that we now see ourselves as merely
complex machines, whose thoughts and behaviors can be controlled and predicted (Minsky,
1986).
The continuing focus on the ‘human machine’ in science is readily found in the field
o f artificial intelligence (AI). Although there have been “diverse viewpoints that have
characterized the leading practitioners and commentators during the first three decades of
AI” (Gardner, 1985, p. 141) one dominant perspective explicitly equates humans with
machines — “strong AI” (Searle, 1980). “According to strong AI, the computer is not
merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer is
a mind” (p. 353). Indeed Marvin Minsky, cofounder of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
at MIT, (which has received research support from Thinking Machines Corporation),
regards the status debate over humans as machines, as simply the inadequacy o f our concept
of machines. He says we think of them too narrowly. Early machines lacked complexity;
they were “simple devices like pulleys, levers, locomotives and typewriters” (Minsky, 1986,
p. 30). Human brains consist o f billions o f cells, whereas present-day computers have only
millions of parts. These, he calls intermediate in complexity. However, in the building stage
are billion-part computers. With this added complexity, we should be able to upgrade our
concept o f machines and, “Then we'll find more self-respect in knowing what wonderful
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machines we are” (p. 30). “Minds are simply what brains do” (p. 287) and those minds are
only computers.
Essential to mechanistic functioning is the concept o f cause and effect. Jacob
Bronowski maintains that it has so dominated our thinking that, it has “been elevated to the
rank o f the central concept o f science” (1978, p. 40) and “has become our natural way of
looking at all problems” (p. 59). This obsession with mechanistic causality is clearly an
extension of Enlightenment thought (Doll, 1993). By the eighteenth century, the ideas of
Galileo, Descartes, and Newton permeated the thinking o f the educated. “Thinkers believed
that the scene of human life was set in a great, fixed geometrical and mechanical order of
nature, a mighty machine eternally pursuing the same unchanging round of cyclical
processes” (Randall, 1940/1976, p. 274). But it also maintained characteristics o f Aristotle's
cosmology —eternal and static. And “this belief in an unchanging cosmos held a firm grip
on Western thinking well into the twentieth century” (Lightman, 1991, p. 9). A clockwork
order set into motion by a watchmaker God became the mechanistic cosmology of the West.
The changes this represents from an earlier time are much deeper than they might
seem. Science from Plato to Galileo was an attempt to discover the use and purpose
inherent in Nature, in things. Nature was harmonious and everything existed according to
its own particular nature. But the new scientific methods o f Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, and
Newton slowly changed both how and what was perceived as Nature. Qualities previously
attributed to a substance — such as wetness or coolness of water — were no longer
explainable in qualitative terms. Water was composed o f particles, a quantitative concept,
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and wetness was no longer a property; it resided in the mind that perceived the water
(Randall, 1940/1976, p.268). Or as Dewey puts it,
Science, it is said, has stripped the world of the qualities which made it
beautiful and congenial ... and presented nature to us as a scene of
indifferent physical particles acting according to mathematical and
mechanical laws. (1929, p. 41)
Knowledge, like mind “became a separate, isolated quantity, removed from the
experiences and wisdom of life” (Doll, 1993, p. 113). The “method of the ancients in basing
their conclusions about knowledge on the nature of the universe in which knowledge
occurs” (Dewey, 1929, p. 41) was being reversed. The new method was to “arrive at
theories regarding the nature o f the universe by means o f theories regarding the nature of
knowledge” (p. 41). Along with a new metaphysics a new epistemology was being bom; a
verifiable epistemology. With the separation o f knowledge from life experience, a gap
between experience and nature began to open —a discontinuity in our tapestry. Today this
gap has become a chasm so wide that the equation between humans and machines is seldom
questioned.
In the sixteenth century, Francis Bacon sowed seeds that would bear fruit in future
centuries. “Bacon's scientist not only looked but behaved like a priest who had the power
of absolving all human misery though science .... He was clothed in all the majesty of a priest
... [and] worship [was] to be accorded to the scientist” (Merchant, 1980, p. 181). The most
divine power in human achievement was Science (Randall, 1940/1976, p. 279). And this
divine power was to be manifested in the control o f Nature. No longer was teleology
important, science could provide the power to determine the ends to which things were put.
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The next, quite logical step was to interpret the role o f the one who controls nature
as the one who creates nature. This can be expressed in several ways. For Harrington it is
scientist as God. He calls for a new faith, a faith founded on technological abilities “««</
nothing e k e ; that man's fate depends first on the proper management of his technical
proficiency .... our only messiahs will be wearing white coats, not in asylums but in chemical
and biological laboratories” (1969, p. 234, emphasis added). The physicist Joseph Schwartz
believes Harrington's call has been answered. He says that science “has today become
magical and religious. Particle accelerators are cathedrals, men in white coats are priests,
the scientific literature is the gospel, and television is the pulpit where scientists promise
miracles in one breath and doom in the next” (1992, p. 187). The architectural design for
the administrative building of the Fermi Lab, with its gigantic particle accelerator, was
deliberately patterned to imply a Gothic cathedral. Victor Frankl finds this position truly
remarkable. He says that “man, as long as he regarded himself as a creature, interpreted his
existence in the image of God, his creator; but as soon as he started considering himself as
a creator, began to interpret his existence merely in the image o f his own creation, the
machine” (1988, p. 16).
The dominant movement of thought through the nineteenth century into the
twentieth placed greater and greater emphasis upon the logico-scientific mode and less and
less upon the narrative, intuitive, metaphoric mode which became almost exclusively
connected with art, literature, and theology. Snow’s two cultures were clearly forming. Two
books written in the 1920s serve as an insightful example of the dichotomy in thinking, the
either-or, as well as the emphasis upon the preeminence of scientific thought. Eugenio
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Rignano published Man Not a Machine: A Study of the Finalistic Aspects o f Life (1926) and
two years later Joseph Needham's reply was published in the form of Man a Machine, in
Answer to a Romantical and Unscientific Treatise Written by Sig. Eugenio Rignano &
Entitled “Man Not a Machine” (1928).
Needham not only scoffed at Rignano's idea about the nature o f humankind, he also
denigrated his

MODE

o f thought — it was ‘unscientific.’ Science and scientific thinking

continues to be viewed as the greatest manifestation o f ‘modernization.’ It is the fuel that
powers the engine of modernism, the modem world view. As Mendelson puts it today, “Not
only are its productions and its explanations or concepts applauded, but its approach, the
‘scientific’ way or world view, is celebrated as marking a distinctly and higher form of
human activity” (1993, p. 23). Scientific technology “has become the dominating factor of
modem civilization” (Brunner, 1949, p.2). Arthur Clarke puts it rather succinctly in Profiles
of the Future: An Inquiry into the Limits of the Possible: “To put it bluntly and brutally, the
machine is going to take over” (1963, p. 213). Not only does he portray humankind as
machine-like, but he predicts machines surpassing human intelligence before the conclusion
of the twenty-first century —a position consistent with Minsky and strong AI.
IS HERBERT SPENCER RIGHT?
To the question ....What Knowledge is of most worth?—the uniform reply
is~Science. This is the verdict on all counts .... For direct self-preservation
.... gaining a livelihood .... parental functions .... good citizen-ship .... the
enjoyment o f art .... purposes o f discipline .... Science ... is the best
preparation for all of these orders o f activity. (Spencer, 1859/1929, pp. 8485)
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Spencer quite literally asserts that science is the answer to everything. Is Minsky right —are
we thinking machines? Is the logico-scientific paradigm the only significant or requisite
pattern of thought?
As Dewey says, we are given to thinking and framing our ideas, our questions in
either-ors. The two questions above, thus framed, require an answer o f yes or no —True
or False. These are closed, objective questions. The answer is implied within the question
(just as on standardized tests). There are no other possible answers, no other choices. That
there is an answer is certain. Such is the scientific method. Hypotheses are either validated
or falsified.
Have we benefitted from this mode of thought? YES, we have walked on the moon
through scientific achievement. Medical science has prolonged life, wiped out epidemics and
alleviated massive human suffering. Electronic communications have established a global
village. The successes are beyond number. NO, we have suffered dearly from the failures.
Lives were lost in the tragic explosions of the Challenger space shuttle and the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant. On May 27, 1993, NBC Nightly News reported a number of patients
testing positive for HIV had been treated at several hospitals around the country by
physicians claiming to have a cure for their disease. The treatments are reportedly neither
legal nor cures. The patients however, said they allowed the treatment procedures because
of an unquestioning trust in scientific medical expertise. This epitomizes what Lieberman
calls the tyranny o f the experts (1970). And Bohme says that “the ‘scientification’ of the
lifeworld is connected with the loss o f people's ability to help themselves; they become
dependent on experts” (1992, p. 51). The tyranny of dependence upon experts brings with
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it a loss of connection on several levels. One loss is on the meaning dimension of the life
tapestry, where our stories are connected to identity and purpose. Therefore, a simple yes
or no answer to the question of whether we have benefitted from science is inadequate.
It is not the mode of thought itself that is problematic. Rather, it is the domination,
the impact and the consequences o f that domination which manifest themselves in all aspects
o f human life, that need examining. To say that science either is or is not the answer is
tacitly to accept Spencer's concept o f science. By science, Spencer meant Descartes and
Newton’s science, out o f which the scientific method as used today, evolved. A closer
investigation o f this method and the way o f thinking that accompanies it can give us a
deeper understanding o f the consequences and persistence of this mode of thought. It can
also lead us to a more comprehensive view of science. The so called ‘new sciences’ of
complexity and quantum physics certainly use, but are not limited to, the logico-scientific
mode o f thought.
For a closer inquiry into the logico-scientific mode, I will begin with the five terms
outlined earlier in the summary o f assumptions that underlie the principles of Newtonian
science: atomism, deterministic order, context-independence, reductionistic methodology,
and mechanism. Atomism assumes all matter is composed o f component parts, therefore
knowledge is discovered by studying the parts. The methodology for dealing with problems,
all problems thus becomes methodological reductionism. This method breaks problems
down into parts for manipulation. The mechanistic assumption views all systems as linear.
Linear problems are simple and solved step by step; one need only find the right formula.
Linear relations can be illustrated with a straight line on a graph. Such systems can be taken
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apart, put back together, and all the pieces add up (Gleick, 1987, p. 23). These are closed,
sequential systems, and work much as machines do. The last two assumptions are then used
to complete the project. Context-independence means that all objects can be examined
directly and will be found to be the same regardless o f time or place. Deterministic order
assumes knowledge gained through this procedure will be universally true because the world
is subject to fixed laws.
The physicist Fritjof Capra sums up classical or Newtonian science nicely. Classical
science views the universe as a vast machine which can be observed “objectively without
ever mentioning the human observer, and such an objective description of nature became
the ideal of all science” (Capra, 1991, p. 56). The world is a machine made o f parts and the
prevailing recipe for understanding things is to take them apart and study the components.
If you don't understand them, take those a p art....
This set of premises and assumptions works well for many scientific endeavors and
forms the foundation of the Scientific Method. However, it is no longer simply the method
for ‘doing science.’ It has been expanded into the dominant metaphysical world view of
Western civilization- - modernism, or modernity (Doll, 1993; Jenks, 1987; Habermas, 1983;
Griffin, 1988). Arthur Peacocke, scientist and theologian, recognizes just how easy it is for
scientists who “employ methodological reductionist concepts .... to transpose this
methodological necessity into a more general philosophical attitude” (1985, p. 7). The
analytic procedure critical for the work o f physical biochemists and molecular biologists
“becomes almost unconsciously a philosophical belief about biological organisms being
‘nothing but’ the bits into which they have analyzed them” (p. 7). He believes this “nothing
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buttery” is without malice or reflection. It is “simply a very natural psychological transition
from the methodological necessities of the way they work to an implicit philosophical
position .... [of] unreflective and implicit reductionists” (p. 7).
This subtle, yet remarkably important shift from methodology to world view is at the
crux of the issue —the problematic of two modes of thought. This small deviation allows,
indeed demands, only one mode o f thought. If all thinking is to be fimneled into a single
conduit, then instead of embracing numerous ways o f knowing, understanding, interpreting,
all thought is to be viewed and understood via a single model, the paradigmatic mode. There
is no outlet for, no emergence o f Bruner's “rich diversity of thought.” Classical science as
represented by only one mode of thought, is woefully inadequate as a world view.
Weltanschauung is the German term for world view or outlook. Weltanschauung
is a generalized view of the universe and a person's relationship to it. It is usually applied to
a philosophy affecting practical attitudes and beliefs rather than the purely theoretical (Flew,
1979, p. 372). The practical always derives from theoretical constructs. Our world views
views so embody our fundamental attitudes that we base our scientific, theological, literary,
educational undertakings on the world view we hold. Our philosophical position provides
the framework by which we interpret the world and thereby establish the very ground from
which our thoughts and actions emerge. These are the assumptions about how we think life
is or ought to be. Not only are these the underpinnings for our individual ideas and theories
about the world, but they also constitute the views held by social institutions, societies and
civilizations. This is the case regardless of our level of awareness o f our world view. Implicit
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world views shape and direct individuals and civilizations with no less power than explicit
ones.
The shift that Peacocke observed in individual scientists from a methodology to a
world view, can also be noted at the “megaparadigm” level (Kung, 1988). Modernism, as
the dominant world view of Western thought today, is a megaparadigm. This megaparadigm
shift is from the premodem world view to the modem and is inextricably bound up with
ideas about science. As noted above, the premodem world view was heavily influenced by
the science of Aristotle. Premodem science studied virtually everything, not merely the
physical world. Nature was viewed as harmonious and purposeful. Qualities rather than
quantities reflected the focus for inquiry. Knowledge was generalizable and interrelated.
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS SHIFT
As we have seen, qualities are not part of modem science. “Throughout history each
culture's cosmology has reflected its view of the world [and] in the West, cosmological
speculations gradually shifted from gods and myths to physical mechanisms” (Lightman,
1991, p. 3 and 7). This shift in thinking is a replacement o f the narrative exclusively with the
logico-scientific mode. The “Newtonian vision is a vision of the world as mechanism. This
vision still dominates Western scientific thought. [And] gone in the Newtonian framework
is human history and the autonomy of human action” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 25). What threads
are missing from our life tapestry?
One mode of thought upon which to build a world view of megaparadigmatic
proportions is just too limiting. In describing the field o f economics since the 1950s,
McColskey states that “economics has believed itself narrowed down to fact and logic”
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becoming a full participant in “the temporary narrowing o f Western culture called
‘positivism’ or ‘modernism’” (1990, p. 5). Fact and logic are o f course, the epitome of
Bruner's logico-scientific mode o f thought. McCloskey says, however, that economics, as
well as other arts and sciences, uses “the whole rhetorical tetrad: fact, logic, metaphor and
story. The allegedly scientific half o f the tetrad, fact and logic, falls short of an adequate
economic [or any other sort of] science .... The allegedly humanistic half falls short o f an
adequate art of economics, or even a criticism of form and color” (1990, p. 1). McCloskey
contends that science is not just fact and logic. “Newton used logic and metaphors; Darwin
used facts and stories” (1990, p. 8).
At this point the reader may assume a shift from the scholarly to the romantic. The
mention of rhetoric may stimulate images o f the ‘merely’ literary. However, that would
mean participation in the “fragmentation of our intellectual life” (Peacocke, 1971, p. 9) into
C.P. Snow's two cultures. He maintains that we have broken our intellectual perceptions
into “two polar groups .... Literary intellectuals at one pole—at the other scientists ....
Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension” (Snow, 1969, p. 2-3). Since, as we
have already seen, science “is celebrated as marking a distinctly and higher form o f human
activity” (Mendelson, 1993, p. 23) it would be easy to make Snow's poles hierarchial with
science intellectually superior to literature. Yet McCloskey claims that science does and
must use the whole rhetorical tetrad. Facts and reason taken to their logical extreme might
otherwise assure us that Hitler reasoned rightly when destroying ‘defective’ and
‘unproductive’ people.
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The absurdity of such a hierarchy and the need to use all that is available to express
ourselves can be seen in examining the term, literature. Having dichotomized academic and
intellectual disciplines into Snow's two cultures, we tend to assume that science actually
exists separately from literature and vice versa. We also tend to limit our concept of what
constitutes literature to novels, plays and poetry. However, in order to do academic
research, be it physics, engineering, or philosophy, a major portion includes a review of ‘the
literature.’ The term used in this manner of course includes all pertinent information current
to that discipline. McCloskey is right. A scan of just a few books or journals will illustrate
that indeed academic literature is comprised of fact, logic, story, and metaphor. For
example, a contemporary scientist teaching the concept o f chaos says, “Junk your old
equations and look for guidance in clouds’ repeating patterns” (Cvitanovic, 1984, p. 4).
Literature is not a matter o f either fact or story. Literature is simply the writing out of all
the ways humankind has communicated throughout history - including communication in
the field of science.
Actually science isn't a listing of facts and logical conclusions anyway. Science “is
a kind of language, and as such it exemplifies the dialogue between mind and nature”
(Ferris, 1992, p. 8). Schwartz goes further in telling us that
Science is an accumulation of written narratives about our relationship to
nature. It is no accident that this repository is called the scientific literature.
The scientific literature consists of narratives, stories of how we have
understood our experiences of the natural world. And like other narratives,
they can be analyzed critically to uncover their unstated assumptions and
hidden meanings. (1992, p. xvi-xvii)
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To view literature as a context for the writing out o f human thought, is not to say
that all literature is of equal importance or intellectual value. It is to say that all elements of
rhetoric are. “Each part of the rhetorical tetrad ... places limits on the excesses o f the others
.... One part of the tetrad checks the other's rank immoderation” (McCloskey, 1990, p. 4).
An oversimplification o f Bruner’s two modes of thought can, as McCloskey suggests,
equate fact and logic with the logico-scientific, on the one hand, and metaphor and story
with the narrative, on the other.
This oversimplification is the reductionistic “nothing buttery” o f modernism. It
results in undue separation between the modes. Indeed, we quickly arrive at Kuhn's very
modern notion o f incommensurability. If the logico-scientific mode of thought, the
paradigmatic, is connected with Newtonian science, the narrative, intuitive mode can be
connected with Einstein's ‘new’ science. Bruner says that “Linguistically and in spirit as
well, the modem novel may be as profound (and perhaps out of the same cradle) as the
invention of modem physics” (1987, p. 21). These modes of thought, like the two sciences,
are complementary and generative to, not incommensurable with, one another.
Particle physicist John Polkinghome questions Kuhn's conclusions. “Kuhn dismisses
as an irrelevancy the well-known fact that Newtonian mechanics is the slow-moving limit
of Einstein's mechanics” (Polkinghome, 1986, p. 15). Kuhn sees the views o f Newton and
Einstein as constituting competing paradigms rather than different points on a continuum.
As such, proponents of each practice their trade in different and incommensurable worlds
(Kuhn, 1970), the worlds o f C.P. Snow's two cultures. Kuhn's conception o f two separate
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worlds, two distinct modes of thought, points to a dualistic pattern of thought into which
philosophers and others tend to fall.
However, Polkinghome, Capra, Bruner and Peacocke all deny the necessity or
inevitability of two separate worlds. They each, in their own way call for an alternative
world view; a world view that combines integration and fragmentation, one I will henceforth
call postmodern. Peacocke says that people “will not be satisfied with a perspective of the
world which indefinitely fragments their experience; they need a framework which will
enable them to weld their individual and corporate lives and thought into an integrated
whole” (1971, p. 8). This new synthesis will be dynamic not static. However, “such a vision
of a new unity in diversity ... will always have a provisional character” (p. 8).
We need not, nor dare, reject any element of thought nor take an either/or position.
Newton's mechanics still work at the everyday level of experience, but only at that level. As
Capra says, “it is a good approximation to say that things consist of constituent parts”
(1991, p. 81). Therefore we can say a grain of salt consists of salt molecules. Salt molecules
consist of two kinds of atoms, and those atoms consist of nuclei and electrons. The nuclei
are composed o f protons and neutrons. However, at the particle level, there is a shift; it is
no longer possible to understand things that way.
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle states that if, at the subatomic, particle level,
we can determine where an electron is, we cannot know what it is doing; if we know what
it is doing, we cannot know where it is (Polkinghome, 1986, p. 5). This seems illogical,
unreasonable. To accept this principle is to recognize “the insights of depth psychology
[which] have modified our understanding of the operation of human reason” (Polkinghome,
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1986, p. 4). It is to go beyond the senses, reason and logic and recognize that “our
conscious minds are counterbalanced by an unconscious component, at once creative,
chaotic and teeming with symbol” (p. 5). It is simply to recognize the limitations of
rationality, objectivity, and determinism. Such acknowledgment need not “relinquish a belief
in reason, a respect for reality or a search for order ... [Rather it can be] an acceptance that
beside the insights of science, expressible in the quantitative language of mathematics, there
are the equally necessary insights ..., expressible in the qualitative language o f symbol”
(Polkinghome, 1986, p. 5).
The scientific method and the paradigmatic mode of thought have never
accomplished anything interesting alone (Polkinghome, 1986). Scientists rely on metaphor
and story as well as fact and logic. It is in the social sciences, and in education in particular,
where reification o f the scientific method has been most commonly practiced. Education
forms the foundation for all disciplines. By the time a student enters college, she has spent
at least twelve years in an educational system dominated by the paradigmatic mode of
thought. For most students today, educational experience is still constructed out o f a
modem world view.
In order to reconstruct educational experience, we need a postmodern world view
that is a scion of premodem and modem ideas, views and thought. Just as quantum physics
transcends classical, Newtonian physics without repudiating it, a Post-modern world view
must contain seeds from premodemism and modernism. In its transformation from its
progenitors, it will embrace the qualities that Polkinghome says characterize a postmodern
scientific view of the world (1986). These qualities depict the world as elusive, intelligible,
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problematic, an interplay of chance and necessity, big, tightly-knit, complete, and
incomplete. A truly adequate postmodern perspective will view the world and its reality in
terms of these multi variate qualities, for our world is too large and complex ever to be
completely understood. Indeed Polkinghome realizes that science, like literature, is not the
fountain of truth but belongs “in the arena of human discourse” (1986, p. 25), and thus,
within the context of a story of agents and what they do. “At any particular moment
verisimilitude is all that can be claimed as science's achievement - an adequate account of
a circumscribed physical regime, a map good enough for some, but not for all purposes” (p.
23). This statement echoes Bruner’s view of art and the humanities. “The aim ... is that the
hypotheses fit different human perspectives and that they be recognizable as ‘true to
conceivable experience’: that they have verisimilitude” (1986, p. 52). This will only be
achieved if we successfully integrate the logico-scientific and narrative modes of thought —
making effective the interweaving of weft and warp to create a tapestry that is a continuous
whole.

CHAPTER THREE
THE NARRATIVE MODE

Narrative imitates life, life imitates narrative.
(Bruner, 1987, p. 13)

What does Bruner mean? What is life, narrative? In his article, “Life as Narrative,”
Bruner says that life involves our memory and interpretation o f “lived time” rather than
chronological. And “we seem to have no other way of describing ‘lived time’ save in the
form o f a narrative” (1987, p. 12). But this is not merely a descriptive process, a trivial
telling of a story; “it is always a cognitive achievement” (p. 13) —an achievement that is a
two-way proposition. Kerby, in his work Narrative and Self, expresses this interactive aspect
o f language usage by saying, today “language is viewed not simply as a tool for
communication or mirroring back what we otherwise discover in our reality but is itself an
important formative part of that reality” (1991, p. 2). (Further significance of this statement
will emerge in an ensuing chapter with an examination o f how dominant metaphors help
shape our social, cultural and educational realities.)
A brief exploration into the historical use o f the term narrative is needed at this
point. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (hereafter OED1 the word narrate came
into regular English usage only after 1750. Prior to that time the term was principally
translated from Latin or Spanish. Both the Latin stems ncirrae to relate, recount and gnaws
knowing, skilled, and thus ultimately allied to know fOED. 1971, p. 1896) constituted the
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early use of the verb narrate and the noun narrative. In other words, what could be known
and related in words was narrative. The scope o f narration was broad indeed. The
recounting of history was narrative, telling a story was narrative, relating the positions of
the planets was narrative, portions of poems were narrative. Indeed, “the most inclusive
meaning o f ‘narrative’ refers to any spoken or written presentation” (Polkinghome, 1988,
p. 13).
It is no coincidence that the application of the word narrative has narrowed
dramatically over the years since 1750. As we saw in Chapter Two, the intervening years
coincide with modernism. As was shown, one project o f modernism was to define,
determine and delineate completely. Everything was presumed knowable once reduced to
its most basic form. The meaning and use o f the word narrative shifted from a way of
relating or telling anything that is knowable to a very particular form o f language use. In
everyday speech today, narrative is simply a story or tale and story is the synonym for
narrative (Webster's New World Dictionary. 1988, p. 901). This corresponds to the change
in the term literature. Stories are nice to read to children at bedtime, but o f little
epistemological significance in the modernist world view.
This truncated use o f narrative is hardly what Bruner or Kerby mean. They each
reach back to reclaim both relating and knowing as constituents of narrative. Bruner,
however, focuses primarily on the telling o f life stories in discussing the importance of the
narrative mode of thought (1986,1987). Using Kerby's arguments regarding the significance
o f narrative, we can go further. He says, “narratives are a primary embodiment of our
understanding of the world, o f experience, and ultimately ourselves”(1991, p. 3). Through
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the use o f narrative we can acquire a form o f understanding that cannot be attained
elsewhere. It is through narrative that we express our cosmology. Lightman says, “Although
based in the methods o f science, modern cosmology asks primeval questions and thus sits
near the boundary between science, philosophy, and religion” (1991, p. 3). This boundary
cannot exist solely in either the logico-scientific mode or the narrative mode —it can exist
only in the interplay o f the two. The logico-scientific mode enables us to answer the ‘how
and what’ questions of the universe. The narrative mode permits us to examine the ‘whys.’
We require both modes to get a dynamic, productive, and creative understanding o f life as
meaningful.
One major aspect of narrative is its relational quality. “Narratives articulate not just
isolated acts but whole sequences o f events or episodes, thereby placing particular events
within a framing context or history” (Lightman, 1991, p. 3). Donald Polkinghome makes
an even stronger case when he says that “narrative is the fundamental scheme for linking
individual human action and events into interrelated aspects of an understandable composite.
Narrative displays the significance that events have for one another” (1988, p. 13).
This relational quality resembles the hermeneutic circle —circle o f understanding.
In hermeneutics, understanding is gained in the relationship of parts and the whole: the
whole is understood in relation to the parts that comprise it and the parts are understood in
relation to the whole. Kerby says that it is through the unifying action of narrative that we
gain meaning. “In other words, isolated events need to be placed within a developing
network o f further acts if their broader significance is to be grasped” (1991, p. 3-4).
Gadamer, in discussing hermeneutics, makes an implicit connection with narrative in saying
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that “the meaning to be understood is concretized and fully realized only in interpretation”
(1989, p. 332). To “understand something is to grasp its meaning or significance. To
interpret something is to apprehend what it signifies for a certain standpoint or situation”
(Kneller, 1984, p. 67). Thus, understanding and meaning come through interpretation of
things or events framed within a context. A life tapestry, a pictorial narrative is comprised
of separate threads woven together in such a way that meaning and significance emerge.
Perhaps the greatest significance of the relational aspect of narrative is the intrinsic
importance of relationship. Nobel Laureate Jonas Salk says that “the most fundamental
phenomenon in the universe is relationship. ... [It is the] fundamental unifying principle in
the cosmos” (1983, p. 44 and 37). Frederic Burnham puts it even more succinctly when he
says, “Relationships, not things, are fundamental” (1991, p. 5). O f course this concept of
the primacy of relationship is woven implicitly and explicitly throughout much of the current
literature that considers the new sciences (Whitehead, 1929/1978; Peacocke, 1986; Ford,
1987; Davies, 1988; Flayles, 1991; Lewin, 1992; Doll, 1993). Of Doll's four R's, rich,
recursive, relational, and rigorous, (1993) it is precisely the relational quality o f life that a
solely mechanical, quantitative view omits.
Gregory Bateson illuminates the contextual aspect o f narrative when he talks about
the necessity of context in order to have meaning. He says that context is pattern through
time and “all communication necessitates context, that without context, there is no meaning,
and that contexts confer meaning because there is classification of contexts” (1979, p. 18).
In one context, the word, ‘weather,’ means general atmospheric conditions. In a context of
building construction, ‘to weather a sill,’ means to slope it in such a way that water will run
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off, but also a weathered sill can be one that has been worn by weather conditions over time.
And o f course, something quite different is meant when we say that someone is under the
weather. “Nothing has meaning except it be seen as in some context. ... It is the context that
fixes the meaning” (1979, p. 15 and 17).
Narrative provides context, logic does not. Bateson points out that logic is noncontextual because it is timeless (1979). Logic does not require, nor take into account, time.
If A ... then B ... therefore C .... (A) Socrates is a man, (B) All men die, Therefore Socrates
will die. Even though this syllogism holds across time, it implies a cause and effect
relationship that is not necessarily timeless. Here the ‘cause’ o f Socrates^ death is his
timeless status as a man.
Bateson uses a simple example of how the timelessness o f logic can be problematic
as a model of cause and effect. He uses the simple buzzer circuit to demonstrate his point:
current will pass around the circuit when the armature makes contact with
the electrode at A. But the passage o f current activates the electromagnet
that will draw the armature away, breaking the contact at A. The current will
then cease to pass around the circuit, the electromagnet will become
inactive, and the armature will return to make contact at A and so repeat the
cycle.
If we spell out this cycle onto a causal sequence, we get the
following:
I f contact is made at A, then the magnet is
activated.
I f the magnet is activated, then contact at A is
broken.
I f the contact at A is broken, then the magnet is
inactivated.
I f magnet is inactivated, then contact is made.
(p. 65).
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Bateson tells us that the ifs and thens in this sequence are quite fine as long as we
understand them to be causal rather than logical. If we try to fit this into logic, we are left
with:
"If the contact is made, then the contact is broken.
IfP, then not P.
The if... then of causality contains time, but the if... then of logic is timeless” (p. 66).
How then are we to understand what narrative is? Thus far, we have seen it as a
term with narrowed usage over time and its importance has greatly diminished. Yet
advocates of narrative say it is a mode of thinking (Bruner, 1986), a way o f understanding
all that we comprehend (Polkinghome, 1988: Kerby, 1991), a way of knowing
(Polkinghome, 1988), and that the temporal and contextual aspects enable us to interpret
and gain meaning (Kneller, 1984; Bruner, 1986; Gadamer, 1989). Indeed, Fuller says that
“story is the basis o f intellectual cohesion” (1982, p. 134). Narrative may be considered a
primary means by which humans make sense of their experience (Gee, 1985; Hymes, 1982).
As a field, the study of narrative is vast and growing. A brief scan of the holdings
of a local university library reveal nearly three thousand titles containing the word narrative.
Hundreds of the volumes were published between 1990 and 1994. The same library carries
two journals devoted exclusively to narrative. The work o f both Levi-Strauss and Propp
“provided the guiding texts for French structuralism” (Polkinghome, 1988, p. 85) out of
which has emerged narratology — the theory o f narrative (Prince, 1987). The range of
research in narrative and narratology is performed by linguists and literarians, psychologists
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and psychiatrists, anthropologists and sociologists, reading specialists and educators of
various backgrounds, to name just a few.
With so many researchers investigating narrative, why is it still viewed so
disparagingly? Mancuso characterizes the conflict between advocates of the narrative mode,
narrative structure (Me Cabe, 1991), or story grammar as deriving from “the clash between
basic paradigms which guide the thinking of the commentators” (Mancuso, 1986, p. 99). He
states, somewhat reductionistieally, that “advocates of the story grammar reason from a
contextualist/constructivist (Kantian) paradigm. Critics ... reason from a mechanist
(Lockean) paradigm” (p. 99).
This places us back in the realm o f epistemological debate. Which form of
knowledge or way of knowing is superior? Which is therefore inconsequential? The question
in this hierarchial, either/or form is unanswerable. Echoing Bruner, Donald Polkinghome
says that “no single knowledge system is capable of encompassing the full range o f the strata
of human existence” (1988, p. 3). Scientific and narrative enterprises are different ways to
investigate and express various aspects of the world. Scientific inquiry searches for
principles or laws. “These principles are general, context-free, usually abstract, and testable
only by further formal scientific activity” (Robinson and Hawpe, 1986, p. 114). This
contrasts with narrative. “Narrative thought, story, is context-bound, concrete, and testable
through ordinary interpersonal checking” (p. 114). A further and important distinction is,
“theories do not have a generic form” (p. 114). Whatever relationships and concepts any
theory contains will be determined by the object or event under investigation. “In scientific
reasoning the similarity of one phenomena [sic] to any other is defined by strict criteria....
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Story is flexible where principle is rigid. Unlike a scientific law or principle, a story is open
to interpretation” (p. 114 and 115). In paradigmatic thinking, there is no place for
consideration of either the resemblances or differences that stories may elicit or reveal. On
the importance o f story, Rosen relates that it has been said that story “is a primary and
irreducible form of human comprehension [and] it is the central instance or function of
human mind” (1986, p. 230)
Theoretical physicist and Anglican priest, John Polkinghome says that because there
is “a continuation o f the Enlightenment distrust o f all knowledge which is not patterned
according to the paradigm o f scientific method” (1986, p. 6), narrative knowing is neither
significant nor valued. Even though the post-Newtonian (or postmodern) science of
“quantum theory represents a transformation o f our understanding of the physical world”
(p. 44), we have difficulty revising our metaphysical concepts. The difficulty of moving
beyond the determinism and rigidity o f the logico-scientific mode o f thought is exemplified
by the following quote by Joseph Margolis. He says that we have been driven to
concede that the human sciences...may well be significantly different from
the physical sciences, both methodologically and ontologically. Language
appears to be sui generis: ... inseparable as far as meaning is concerned
from the changing, novel, nonlinguistic experience of a people; incapable
o f being formulated as a closed system o f rules ... subject also to
ineliminable psychological indeterminancies regarding intention and action.
(1984, p. 80)
On the surface, at a literal level, this is true, but a closer examination reveals some o f the
assumptions about the physical world that are not consistent with postmodern science and
therefore create a Cartesian-like split between physical and human sciences. Chance,
novelty, open systems and indeterminacy are all characteristics o f the physical world at
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various levels. There is no need for a one-to-one correlation between types o f science. And
the tone Margolis uses seems to indicate that concession relegates the human sciences to a
second rate status.
In Chapter Two, we saw how the logico-scientific mode o f thought developed from
Descartes to Newton. Early in this process, narrative knowledge was still privileged.
Religion continued to play a primary role in Western culture and religion has always made
rich use of narrative. But by the middle of the twentieth century, science had usurped much
of the role and most o f the influence of religion, and the logico-scientific mode of thinking
had clearly declared narrative “immaterial” (Kung, 1988; Lightman, 1991; Schwartz, 1992).
The segregation o f types of knowledge, ways o f knowing into the various disciplines
became increasingly rigid with the onset o f professionalism. “The striving for
professionalization of non-scientific traditions has resulted in their transformation into
scientific knowledge” (Bohme, 1992, p. 61). Bohme says that this is not due to “the
superiority of science over other types o f knowledge but the fact that in our society social
opportunities are largely distributed according to certificates of knowledge” (p. 61). This
certification of professionalism continues to dominate the field of education.
Throughout human history, we have asked the same sorts o f questions about the
world that we ask today: how, what, when, why? These questions can be divided into two
main realms. How did the universe form? How far away are the stars? What causes a flower
to bloom? When did dinosaurs walk the earth? These questions are about the physical,
material world. But the ‘why’ questions are different in kind —they reside in the realm of
meaning and purpose. Why was the universe created? What does it mean to be human?
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Until the methods of Descartes and Newton were developed and refined, we had
veiy limited abilities to answer the how and when questions. The why questions were asked
in the same breath. Together, both sorts of questions formed the whole cloth o f the life
tapestry. Before, and even during the Enlightenment, there were no scientists per se.
Newton studied physics, mathematics, and astronomy but was called a natural philosopher.
Underlying the how questions ran the thread o f why, weaving the warp and weft threads
together.
It is only in this century when science and scientific thinking have became so separate
from religion and philosophy that the why questions about meaning have been isolated from
inquiry about nature and have lost prominence. With greater and greater degrees of
precision, science is explaining the origin o f the universe — what happened, when it
happened, how it happened, but science will never tell us why it happened. Science discovers
literal, factual information about the physical world. But the “realm o f meaning is not a thing
or substance, but an activity. Narrative is one o f the operations of the realm of meaning”
(Polkinghome, 1988, p. 4). Science functions on the horizontal level o f material reality and
cannot answer questions in the realm or dimension o f meaning; it cannot tell us why the
universe was created. The dimension o f meaning is the dimension o f ‘why.’
Interestingly enough, the separation o f scientific endeavors from the realms of
meaning are not complete. As the dominant mode o f thought, the paradigmatic evaluates
and passes judgment on narrative. A “common supposition is that explication means
improvement o f knowledge” (Bohme, 1992, p. 59). The scientific way is to make things
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literal (concrete, to the letter), straightforward, explicit. If something cannot be explained
literally, it is considered irrelevant.
A good example of how the logico-scientific mode of thinking permeates American
thought can be seen in the incredible controversy over one of the central narratives of
Western civilization —the creation story in the book of Genesis. From a logico-scientific
point o f view, the literal account of creation in Genesis is inaccurate; one might even say
absurd. Science assures us a seven-day time frame is several billion years too short.
Scientifically speaking, the story is false. Science dispenses with falsity. Therefore, the
creation story in Genesis is o f no consequence —to science.
One might expect non-religious scientists to find the account false for two reasons:
first, because they apply logico-scientific thinking, and second, because they have no
particular interest in its validity anyway. However, they are not the only ones using that
mode of thought in relation to the Genesis story. Religious fundamentalists who do have
tremendous investment in the validity o f the account, approach it from the same
paradigmatic mode of thought. Both groups deal with the story on a literal level. Even when
the conclusions differ, the method or mode of thinking is the same —literal, factual. Those
who believe the Genesis story as a literal account of creation have had to develop a ‘science’
o f their own -- Creationism, in order to substantiate the events as told in Genesis. This kind
of religious thinking is religion that has itself been shaped by the logico-scientific mode. The
creation account for them is true because it fits the literal facts as defined by their ‘science.’
It is true and meaningful only because it is literal. The account is false to the scientists
because it is not scientific, not confirmable by any recognized scientific criteria. It is
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important to note that the issue here is not whether the account is, or is not, literally true.
The point is that both groups approach the story on a literal level.
The Genesis account o f creation is and always has been, a narrative. As a narrative
it is very powerful, rich with meaning. Diane Brunner vividly expresses the heuristic power
of narrative when she recounts her own experience of growing up with stories. She says that
through story,
I learned about uncertainty, and I learned to do more than just tolerate the
ambiguities that seemed so much a part o f my world. I learned to take up
those ambiguities or conflicts and work them over and over in my mind
struggling to find meaning. (1994, p. xv)
There is little to struggle with on the literal level, things are either true or untrue. The two
differing accounts o f creation in Genesis generate tension -- an energy that both animates
and invites struggle. The listener/reader asks, “Why two accounts? What does it mean?
What insights can be gained?” There are no fixed answers. Insights, ideas, interpretations,
thoughts generated will differ with additional readings over time, and, as the contexts of the
lives o f individuals or of society change, there will be still more ways to understand. As
narrative, the Genesis account invites the reader to wrestle with the story. As narrative, it
serves as one vehicle for interpreting the meaning(s) o f creation, of humankind, of life, of
relationships. And only because it is narrative is it burgeoning with possibilities.
WAYS OF KNOWING
Science is a way of knowing, a type of understanding, a kind o f knowledge (Bohme,
1992; Schwartz, 1992), not knowledge or the way of knowing. Bohme emphasizes the need
for us to return to an understanding that scientific knowing is “a possible knowledge form

on a wide spectrum of knowledge forms” (1992, p. 13). And it is important to realize that
there is more than one form o f scientific knowing. “Science is an accumulation o f written
narratives about our relationship to nature” (Schwartz, 1992, p. xvi). Science is as much a
human construction of reality as is art. “Our physics no less than our movies express ideas
about ourselves and our possibilities” (Schwartz, 1992, p. xix). This notion that science
incorporates more than one way of knowing has hopefully already emerged for the reader.
We have seen that Classical or Newtonian mechanics embodies a kind of scientific
knowledge and understanding o f the world that is characterized by Bruner's paradigmatic,
logico-scientific mode of thought (1986). Quantum mechanics and the new sciences embody
a kind o f scientific knowledge and understanding of the world that uses, but is not limited
to, the paradigmatic mode; it values other knowledge pathways as well (Bohme, 1992;
Lewin, 1992; Schwartz, 1992; Davies, 1988; Peacocke, 1986; Bateson, 1979).
In his book, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences. Polkinghome says that
“narrative is a schema by means of which human beings give meaning to their experience of
temporality and personal actions” (1988, p. 11). Narrative knowing operates as a way to
give form to understanding. It provides a framework by which we can interpret past events,
plan future actions and understand a purpose to life.
The three aspects of narrative we have focused upon thus far are context,
relationship and time. The immense amount o f research on narrative structures, story
grammar, narrative knowing includes these but goes far beyond the scope of this
dissertation. Therefore I will only briefly examine two concepts central to the development
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o f narrative structures or story grammar: object permanence and time. Time is related to
context and object permanence is fundamentally relational.
“Concepts of time, which also form a base for the acquisition of story structure, are
interlinked with ability to intercoordinate schemata” (Mancuso, 1986, p. 100). Piaget
explained the development o f this concept as arising, for example, from the infant's use of
a tool such as a stick, or support structure to pull up on, as a way to obtain an object at a
distance. Various things take place as the child pulls up and moves toward the object. Of
importance here is the fact that the child will “correlate the succession or duration of
particular actions with spatial displacements ... It is only once spatial groups of
displacements have been constructed that time itself can become objectified” (1969, p. 280281). Time can link events both chronologically and causally. Time is both linear and
circular —events happen one after the other... incidents occur over and over again.
Object permanence develops as a consequence of repeated sensorimotor actions
whereby the infant develops an internalized representation o f the object. The infant ‘knows’
that the object still exists even when it is not within range of sensory perception (Lemer and
Hultsch, 1983; Piaget, 1950). This internalization o f the external world is vital for a depth
of knowing and for continuity of experience. The child ‘knows’ the object exists because
of encounters with it through sensory experience. The passage of time is also necessary so
that the child loses sensory contact with the object and regains contact later. Once the
concept of object permanence is formed, the child can still know or connect with the object
by internally visualizing it. Bohme says that knowing is “the way in which people take part
in the things to be known” (1992, p. 56) —knowing requires participatory experience.
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The kind of knowing that Bohme is describing is what Gilbert Ryle calls “knowing
how” and distinguishes from “knowing that” (1949, p.27). The distinction between “how”
and “that” is fundamentally the difference between facts and experience. Spinoza, writing
in the 17th century used the terms “knowledge o f ’ and “knowledge about” to characterize
the same concepts (1985). And Donald Oliver makes the “distinction between grounded
knowing and technical knowing” (1990, p. 64).
These two kinds of knowledge or knowing are closely connected to the two modes
of thought we have examined —the logico-scientific and narrative. Narrative knowing can
be linked with grounded knowing, or knowledge of, or knowing how, through the
contextual element o f lived experience that is part of the narrative process. The logicoscientific mode fits more closely with knowledge about, knowing that, or technical
knowing, via the factual, ‘objective’ aspect of the scientific method. What is important to
note here is that both modes, with the attendant kinds o f knowing, are vital for the greatest
balance and completeness o f understanding. Narrative furnishes a sense o f continuity to
experience through which we interpret events and find meaning. The logical and scientific
provide us with data to enrich and strengthen our interpretations. An example will help
clarify the distinctions and connections I am making.
A man wants to travel from New Orleans, LA to Gulfport, MS. The man asks his
uncle for help. If the uncle interacts with his nephew on a strictly logico-scientific level, he
might simply provide a map o f Louisiana and Mississippi. The nephew will presumably be
able to make the trip provided he ‘knows how’ to read a map. If he lacks that technical
knowing, he will have great difficulty.
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If, on the other hand, the uncle uses a limited narrative, the nephew will have no
greater success. Such a narrative might have the uncle recounting his boyhood travels to
Gulfport with his family during the summer. He isn't really sure which direction or how far
Gulfport is from New Orleans, but he does remember that it took them most o f the day to
get there. He might tell an engaging story but not one that would help his nephew get to
Gulfport.
An interplay of technical and grounded knowing, narrative and logic-scientific modes
would include information and explanations left out o f the first two examples. The uncle
gives the nephew a map. The nephew says he really doesn't know how to use one. So the
uncle begins a detailed and somewhat lengthy description of how the nephew's past travel
experiences relate to the map —places the uncle and nephew have gone together and where
those places are in relation to New Orleans. Next the uncle gives directions about where I10, which the nephew will take, is in relation to where they are currently standing. From
there the uncle returns to the map and shows I-10, follows the line to Gulfport. He describes
landmarks along the way and points out where their various locations correspond to the
map.
What I have just described could be called a technical narrative. This technical
narrative gives sufficient data combined, with the nephew's previous ‘knowledge o f travel,
to enable him to complete the trip from New Orleans to Gulfport. It is efficient, effective but
not terribly interesting.
If a more complete use o f the narrative mode and greater interplay o f the technical
were employed, the uncle might tell his nephew about the scenic route —that nearly half the

55

trip could be taken along the water’s edge where he might see gulls and terns skimming
along the shore, a porpoise or two breaking through the calm surface of the gulf. He would
tell his nephew what signs to look for when turning off I-10, and show him where that
turning was located on the map. A reminder of the last time they went past that spot
together would bring a visual image into the nephew’s mind. “You remember, its right there
where that fancy new tourist information place is, the one that’s about a mile past that high
bridge that goes over the Jordan river — the one that crosses you from Louisiana into
Mississippi.” The uncle could also tell him about possible places to dine along the way. He
might reminisce about the little restaurant that juts out over the water at harbor’s edge —
the restaurant where he proposed to his wife. And because the story is being recounted by
his favorite uncle, it might be meaningful to the nephew to stop there —especially now since
he too is contemplating marriage. One step deeper into narrative would find the uncle telling
his nephew about the mystery and myths surrounding the pile of rocks that are all that
remain of an ancient lighthouse —stories, myths of shipwrecks, pirates and buried treasure.
The descriptions of knowing and the modes of thought mentioned above are quite
abbreviated, but serve to make the point that it is only in the interplay of both modes that
life can be lived most fully. The deeper the interplay, the richer the possibilities. The
technical narrative would have been sufficient to enable the nephew to travel from New
Orleans to Gulfport but it would not have added anything significant or meaningful to his
life, nor necessarily, would the trip. However, with the enriched narrative, the nephew had
the possibility, both through the experience o f the narrative itself and by participating in the
trip it suggested, of adding new meaning in numerous realms.
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The need for an interplay of modes is very much like what Peacocke says about the
generation of life itself —it is only possible through the interplay of chance/randomness and
law/determinism (1986, p. 97). He says that
A universe under the iron grip o f a law-like determinism at both the microand macro- levels would simply repeat all its past patterns and not allow the
formation of new ones; whereas a universe in which randomness alone
reigned would not contain any recognizable, enduring forms at all and could
scarcely be a 'cosmos', (p. 180-181)
It is perhaps not too difficult to imagine what life would be if we took narrative to a random
extreme. Most of us know people who live ‘chaotic’ lives. At the extreme, we would not
be able to ever tell ‘fact’ from ‘fiction.’ There would be no real structure o f form, plan to
what we did, little would be accomplished. Life would be much like the instability o f
schizophrenia.
On the other hand, the logico-scientific mode is paradigmatic. Its dominance is
hardly noticed, nor are some of the effects o f its domination. But if taken to an extreme by
eliminating the narrative with its interpretive capacity, it can leach the animation from our
human endeavors with an iron grip. Oliver Sacks describes a patient, Dr. P., who had lost
the ability visually to recognize or represent his world (1987). There was no problem with
his eyes, and, superficially, Dr. P. didn't seem exceptional. Closer examination revealed an
utterly altered life. Sacks said o f Dr. P., that
visually, he was lost in a world of lifeless abstractions ... [and] functioned
precisely as a machine functions. It wasn't merely that he displayed the same
indifference to the visual world as a computer but —even more strikingly —
he construed the world as a computer construes it, by means of key
functions and schematic relationships. The scheme might be identified —in
an 'identi-kit' way —without the reality being grasped at all.(p. 15)
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Dr. P. was able to continue teaching music and perform most ordinary daily tasks as long
as he hummed or sang to maintain continuity. For example, if he was interrupted while
eating, he would remain motionless until his wife intervened. If she poured coffee, the smell
would stimulate his nose and he would begin eating and humming again. Sacks says that
even though the brain does indeed function as a computer, as humans, we are more than
that. “Our mental processes, which constitute our being and life, are not just abstract and
mechanical, but personal, as well —and as such involve ... continual judging and feeling
also. If this is missing, we become computer-like, as Dr. P. was” (p. 20). And if we omit
feeling, judgment, interpretation —“the personal” —from the cognitive sciences, we will
reduce them to something as debilitated as Dr. P. (p. 20).
In order to live the fullest, most complete and meaningful lives and educate ourselves
and others, we need to use all of our mental processes fully. We have spent the last several
centuries developing the logico-scientific mode to great advantage. My plea is for us also
to examine, explore, develop more fully the narrative mode. Rich, diverse, creative
understanding lurks within the narrative realm, waiting to deepen our experiences of living.
Indeed we need to heed Bateson's warning about “the two great contraries of mental
process, either of which by itself is lethal. Rigor alone is paralytic death, but imagination
alone is insanity” (1979, p. 242). Means to bridge the gap between the two modes of
thought or “mental processes” can generate deeper understandings, knowledge and
meaning(s) o f ourselves, the educative process, and our universe.

CHAPTER FOUR
METAPHOR

By far the greatest thing for a poet is to be a master o f metaphor.
(Aristotle, 1951, p. 317).

What is metaphor that Aristotle extols by telling us its mastery is the mark o f genius?
When usually asked what a metaphor is, most of us will no doubt recall the definition that
our English teachers gave us: a metaphor is a figure of speech that makes a comparison
between two things without using like or as. Unfortunately, this tells us more about English
teachers than metaphors. It reveals that our English teachers used what Black (1962, 1990)
calls the substitution theory of metaphor. This theory with the comparison view as a special
form, is based in the notion that metaphors are merely figures o f speech. Employment o f this
means that a literal utterance can be substituted for the metaphor or the metaphor is
understood as a compressed simile (Black, 1990). However, neither theory or view sees
metaphor as a particularly important or necessary aspect o f language. It is simply a nice,
flowery, poetic addition to literal discourse, adding nothing more than an aesthetic quality
to language use, hardly a vehicle for genius. Furthermore, in relegating metaphor exclusively
to the backwater of figurative speech, the possibility that it might be something as significant
as a mode of thought is hardly credible. However, it is the purpose of this chapter to
examine just how essential metaphor is both in language use and in thinking.
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The notion that metaphor is profoundly important is not new. Nor is the notion that
metaphor is but worthless nonsense. The pattern o f acceptance and rejection o f the value
and importance of metaphor has a nearly parallel history to dominant modes o f thought.
When logic reigns, metaphor does not. When narrative is important, metaphor is also. As
Aristotle says in The Art of Poetry. (1951) “by far the greatest thing for a poet is to be a
master of metaphor” (p. 317). He goes on to assure us o f the importance o f poetry by
stating that “poetry is something more philosophical and more highly serious than history,
for poetry tends to express universals, history particulars” (p. 302). History deals with dates
and facts, what has been, whereas poetry speaks o f possibilities and abstractions, of qualities
of life. For Aristotle, genius was in the awareness of the “hidden resemblances” in
metaphors.
Dewey tells us that “[hujmankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites”
(1938/1963, p. 17). In a polarized view o f metaphor, Hobbes and Aristotle represent
opposite extremes. Hobbes has no use for metaphors; his disdain is enormous. He insists we
use only literal language. In Leviathan. Hobbes complains bitterly of metaphor and says that
“such speeches are not to be admitted” (Part 1, Ch iv). If Hobbes, had had the benefit of
reading LakofFand Johnson’s, Metaphors We Live By (1980), he may not have completely
changed his mind about metaphors, but may have changed the title of his work, once
realizing it is a metaphor.
The year 1962 is a milestone in the study o f metaphor. Two philosophers, Max
Black and Philip Wheelwright each published books on metaphor that helped to bring a
depth of scholarship, importance, and diverse interest to an area o f study that until then had
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received little attention in scholarly realms beyond examination of the use o f metaphor in
literary works. Wheelwright, in Metaphor and Reality. (1962) took a rather traditional
philosophical approach by focusing on meaning. He “examine[d] conditions under which and
the ways in which metaphor ... can develop into symbol” (p. 69), thereby connecting
metaphors with deeper representation and somewhat less directly with the formation of
world views3. Black, in Models and Metaphors (1962) focused on the conceptual analysis
o f metaphor, and later shifted his focus to functional analysis (1990). Black developed a
specific theory or view of metaphor ~ an interactive view, drawing heavily on I. A. Richard's
work in The Philosophy of Rhetoric published in 1936.
During the decade and a half following Black (1962) and Wheelwright’s (1962)
publications, interest and research in metaphor began to multiply. “In September 1977, a
group o f leading philosophers, psychologists, linguists, and educators gathered ... to
participate in a multidisciplinary conference on metaphor and thought which was attended
by nearly a thousand people” (Ortony, 1993, p. xv) and resulted in the publication of the
edited work, Metaphor and Thought (Ortony, 1979). Since 1979, there has been a swift
elevation of interest in metaphor and research into the nature, role and capacity of metaphor
in language and thought. This increased inquiry and investigation spans the disciplines of
philosophy o f science, philosophy of language, linguistics, psychology — clinical and
cognitive, education and artificial intelligence. In 1980, Lakoff and Johnson published
Metaphors We Live Bv. a work that brings together various aspects o f metaphor, but

3 The connections made by Stephen Pepper in World Hypotheses between root metaphors
and world views will be looked at in Chapter Five.
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primarily examines how metaphors dominate our everyday language use. In 1986, a new
journal, Metaphor and Symbolic Activity was established and in 1990 Metaphor II: A
Classified Bibliography of Publications from 1985-1990 was published with approximately
three thousand five hundred references. In an effort to update and revisit Metaphor and
Thought (1979), Ortony published a second edition in 1993. This volume contains the
original twenty-one chapters, updated where possible, and six supplementary chapters
exemplifying new ideas from additional disciplines. The debate is far from over. Rather, the
depth, profundity and magnitude o f metaphor is just beginning to be explored.
WHAT IS (A) METAPHOR?
At this point, a definition of metaphor might be deemed appropriate. However, the
nature of metaphor is the nature of inquiry. As Doll says “The obverse of the post-structural
dictum ‘to know is to kill’ (definitional knowing aborts unborn thoughts) is that ‘inquiry
frees’ (opens up possibilities)” (1993, p. 62). Any single definition will restrict metaphor to
a distinct realm and confine it in ways that are unacceptable to this work. Instead, I will use
a working postulate that is more theoretical than definitive and the assertions implied will
be addressed throughout the remainder o f the chapter. My theory can be stated as follows:
Metaphor is a way or mode of thought, a kind of thinking and the resultant metaphor
is an example of that process. This statements implies that:
1). Metaphor, in what Gadamer (1989) calls the inherent “metaphoricity of
language,” is to language what elan vital (Bergson, 1905) is to life4. The metaphoricity of

4 My intent here is to indicate the vitality of life, not a force or substance separate from it.
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language is an appropriate area of research which will reveal much information and many
insights; however, it is ultimately as inexplicable as “life force.”
2). Metaphor is both an aspect of language, a creature so to speak, and as Bateson
(1987) says, a way of thinking. The inherent tension of metaphor is irreducible. “A metaphor
is an intersection of indeterminacy and determination” (Vaught, 1987, p. 288). As a mode
of thought, metaphor is to the postmodern science of quantum physics what logic is to the
modern science of Newtonian mechanics. A metaphor cannot be reduced to its parts any
more than a living creature can be reduced to its chemical components. Accordingly:
a. individual metaphors range in levels o f complexity from the equivalent of
single celled creatures to the human brain.
b. possibility for the impact of a metaphor on an individual, group, or society
varies as its complexity does, albeit not in a linear one-to-one relationship.
c. the efficacy of metaphor depends not only on levels o f complexity, but on
differing relations among such variables as context, experience or knowledge frames o f the
hearer, and general appropriateness o f the metaphor.
3). Metaphors are inextricably bound up with our beliefs and perceptions o f reality.
Our views of the world or world views are shaped by metaphors and/or our world views are
interpreted through metaphors. “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms o f which we both
think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 3).
Changes in perceptions need new metaphors and likewise, new metaphors engender shifts
in perceptions and beliefs.
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BLACK'S INTERACTIVE VIEW
In order to explicate my own position on metaphor, I will begin with an examination
of Black's interactive view. It focuses primarily on word relations and only touches on
cognitive aspects. The position that Black takes in developing an interactive view rejects the
reductionism of the substitution and comparison views. He agrees that there is always some
analogy or comparison in metaphors but that is not sufficient to explain what metaphors do.
Black's interaction view includes the following claims:
1. There are always two distinct subjects in a metaphorical statement —a primary
and a secondary.
2. “The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual
thing” (1990, p.59).
3. The metaphor works by “projecting upon” the primary subject some aspects or
features that are part o f the secondary system.
4. The maker o f the metaphor “selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes
features o f the primary subject by applying to statements isomorphic” (p. 60) to the
secondary subject system.
5. “In the context o f a metaphorical statement, the two subjects ‘interact’ in the
following ways”: (p. 60)
a.

the existence of the primary subject encourages the hearer to select some

o f the properties o f the secondary subject; and
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b. invites the hearer to construct a parallel connection-system that fits the
primary subject; and
c. “reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject” (p. 60).
A metaphor, heard too frequently these days, “My classroom is a war zone” can be
used to clarify Black's outline. The primary subject is classroom, the secondary subject is
war zone. A war zone is to be considered a system rather than a thing, which means that all
the interconnected relations o f such a system are possibly applicable to, and are then
“projected” onto classroom. By selection o f the metaphor, war zone, the creator has
selected, emphasized, suppressed and organized features o f classroom that parallel war
zones. The interaction takes place when the hearer begins making the connections between
war zones and classrooms. This becomes a reciprocal process when one thinks about both
what war zones are like and applies those characteristics to classrooms, and also thinks
about what classrooms are like and applies parallel properties in war zones.
Using the above example, how can we detect the difference between the metaphor
that calls a classroom a war zone and a simple comparison between classrooms and war
zones? A simple comparison is simile, which makes only connections of similarity. It is a
direct one-to-one relation limiting the secondary subject to a ‘thing’ rather than a system.
The comparison can then focus on war zone as a ‘place.’ My classroom is a war zone; war
zones are places where people fight; an appropriate literal substitution would then be the
statement: A classroom is a place where people fight. Or a compressed simile view would
add ‘like’ to the statement making it: My classroom is like a war zone. This is a logical
comparison. As such, neither comparison encourages nor necessitates more than one
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instance o f similarity and can therefore also be reduced to the literal statement about fights.
The interaction that Black insists on moves us beyond this simplistic and reductionist view.
It requires more than logic.
One aspect of metaphor that moves us beyond simile is the tension inherent in
metaphorical statements (Black, 1962; Wheelwright, 1962). When we state that something
IS something else — my classroom is a war zone —when it is not literally so, we create
tension between the two subjects. Foss states that, “Metaphor is a process of tension and
energy manifested in the process of language, not in the single word” (1949, p 61).
However, tension is something we constantly try to resolve. This notion of tension and the
desire to resolve it brings us into the realm of thought. If the tension metaphors generate can
be resolved, dissolved, by reducing them to simple comparisons or literal statements, then
there is no uncertainty —the thing either is or is not what it is compared to. Dewey reminds
us that humankind “is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors” (1938/1963,
p. 17), and in so doing, reminds us how much we desire certainty.
The desire or quest for certainty is surely one reason metaphor has been so despised
and disparaged. Certainty requires direct approaches to specific situations. “A metaphor is
an indirect comparison, whereas a simile is a direct comparison, albeit also nonliteral”
(Glucksburg and Keysar, 1990, p. 4). By using similes, we include ‘like’ or ‘as,’ which
function as subtle markers indicating direct comparisons o f similarity. They also serve as
subtle reminders that we are indeed making a comparison, not an identity. Metaphors as
indirect comparisons imply some things, suggest others, point toward possibilities, generate
and create tension. As Black says, the secondary subject is an entire system, not just a thing.
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As a system, there are multiple possible relations to draw upon or exclude. Some relations
readily fit, others seem obviously unsuited and others still, perhaps the greatest number of
possible relations, are uncertain — they may or may not apply depending on context,
temporality or other considerations. O f course this doesn't even take the experiences or
knowledge domains of the hearer into account in attempting to ascertain how the metaphor
will ‘work’ or be understood.
A further consideration o f the interactive aspect of metaphor is the reciprocal
changes in the two subjects. As Black puts it, the metaphor “suppresses some details,
emphasizes others -- in short, organizes our view” (1962, p. 41) of the secondary subject.
Put another way, the metaphor war zone becomes the organizing factor in our view of
classrooms. He says we must not “neglect the shifts in attitude that regularly result from the
use o f metaphorical language” (p. 42). Shifts in attitude include, result in, or occur from
changes in perception. This is of fundamental importance in examining the overall
importance and impact of metaphor. What shifts in attitude occur when we metaphorically
speak of classrooms as war zones?
COMPARING VIEWS
Black's interactive view o f metaphor is not incompatible with mine. Indeed, it serves
as well for me as a frame from which to work as it does for numerous others currently
exploring metaphor (Tourangeau and Rips, 1991; Bredin, 1992; Ortony, 1993; Steinhart,
1994). However, some areas that Black addresses, I will explore from a different point of
view or a stronger position. I take a more emphatic stand on the creative power of metaphor
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metaphor and therefore see a greater overall impact on, and possibilities for all areas of
human endeavor.
By 1979, Black had moved somewhat beyond his original work in Models and
Metaphor (1962). He became willing to defend a more distinctly philosophical stand or what
he called a stronger creative thesis. He says, “Indeed, I intend to defend the implausible
contention that a metaphorical statement can sometimes generate new knowledge and
insight by changing relationships between things designated ... To agree would be to assign
a strong cognitive function to certain metaphors” (1990, p. 70). He goes on to call
metaphors that reveal connections generative and says they function as cognitive
instruments. I do not find his statement implausible, indeed, I believe that new knowledge
and insight frequently have some connection to metaphor by way of metaphorical thought.
Perhaps Black’s most significant statement, hesitant though it is, is one near the end
o f his essay “More about Metaphor” first published in 1977 (with several later reprints).
There he states:
I still wish to contend that some metaphors enable us to see aspects of
reality that the metaphor's production helps us to constitute. But that is no
longer surprising if one believes that the world is necessarily a world under
a certain description — or a world seen from a certain perspective. Some
metaphors can create such a perspective. (1990, p. 74)
Since Black first published that statement in 1977, the view that the world seen is necessarily
under “a certain perspective” or perspectives is no longer new or marginal. It is inextricably
tied to postmodern science and postmodern thought. The third implication of my theory
moves beyond, or perhaps picks up, where Black leaves off. As Boyd says, some
“metaphors are constitutive o f the theories they express, rather than merely exegetical”
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(1993, p. 486). Both the exegetical and constitutive aspects o f metaphor necessitate deeper
inquiry.
AREAS OF EMPHASIS
Black approaches his view o f metaphor by attending primarily to metaphors as
objects. Metaphors, metaphorical statements exist and are therefore things to be examined.
He includes cognitive function as part o f what metaphors ‘do’ but maintains focus on the
metaphor itself. The hearer of the metaphor is mentioned in connection with how he or she
might be affected by the metaphor, but Black rarely considers how metaphors are generated.
When Black uses the term metaphorical thinking, he is referring to how a metaphor is
interpreted rather than the generation o f a metaphor as a way to think about or better
understand something new. He mainly mentions the metaphor-maker in reference to the
maker’s choice of secondary subject and how this choice suppresses or stresses certain
aspects o f the primary subject. In other words, Black looks at what happens once a
metaphor exists. This separation of the metaphor from the metaphor-maker, separates
language from thinker, language from thought, whereas, Gadamer’s affirmation o f the
“metaphoricity of language”5and “the ultimate unity of speech and thought” (1989, p. 433)
precludes a separating o f language from the user.
This unitary position is one that becomes central for my inquiry. When Gadamer
speaks o f language and concept formation, he is erasing lines that have been artificially

By the metaphoricity of language, I understand Gadamer to mean the necessity of making
analogous connections with things already grasped in order to understand anything new.
Any new experience must be connected to some previous concept, idea, or experience for
understanding to occur.
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drawn between linguistics and thought. He says that, “'Language is the universal medium
in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting’ (1989, p. 389). And
“human experience of the world is verbal”6 (p. 450). Accepting Gadamer’s assertions places
me in a hermeneutic frame. It is difficult to imagine ways to investigate metaphor adequately
without considering interpretive experience.
Gadamer tells us that verbal (what I am calling language) consciousness always
participates in metaphor and lacks the explicit reflective process o f logic. “If a person
transfers an expression from one thing to another, he has in mind something that is common
to both” (p. 429), but this need not be “generic universality.” Rather, Gadamer says, the
person is simply following his or her expanding experience, which looks for similarities both
in appearances o f things and/or their meaning for us. “The genius o f verbal consciousness
consists in being able to express these similarities. This is its fundamental metaphorical
nature” (p. 429). And the common figure o f metaphor is “only the rhetorical form o f this
universal —both linguistic and logical —generative principle” (p. 431).
Gadamer says that concept formations depend upon the “living metaphoricity of
language.” Speaking of course implies the use of extant words with customary meanings,
but “at the same time, a constant process of concept formation is going on, by means of
which the life of language develops” (p. 429). This occurs at the level of both the individual

Verbal is perhaps an unfortunate translation o f what Gadamer is signifying. I understand
him to mean language in a very inclusive sense. The term language used this way, includes
not only spoken or written (verbal) expressions, but also any other pattern of organizing
understanding. Language understood this way would include dance, music, and other
modes of expression used to communicate understanding to ourselves or to others.
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language user and collectively with the community by whom the language is used and
generated. It is only when the “natural relationship —i.e., the intimate unity of speech and
thought— is upset” (1989, p. 433) that we can even talk about separating proper and
metaphorical meanings for words. “What originally constituted the basis of the life of
language and its logical productivity, the spontaneous and inventive seeking out of
similarities by means of which it is possible to order things, is now marginalized and
instrumentalized” (p. 432) merely into a figure of speech, an instrument called metaphor.
This instrumentalization of language is a very significant point. Gadamer emphasizes
it when he states that it is “a fundamental principle that wherever words assume a mere sign
function, the original connection between speaking and thinking ... has been changed into
an instrumental relationship” (1989, p.433). He goes on to say that this altered relationship
of word and sign forms the basis o f concept formation in science. This altered relationship
has become so accepted that it takes a special, deliberate effort for us to become aware of
it. The instrumentalization and loss of aesthetic awareness can be seen in the shifting of
words to signs, or put another way, when metaphors take on ‘proper’ literal meaning, the
metaphorical nature o f language is concretized. We forget that mathematics is a language
and formulae are metaphors.
The dominant metaphor of modem science is the machine. In Chapter Two, we saw
that one of the strongest advocates of the machine metaphor for humans is Marvin Minsky.
He says the reason we don't simply accept the ‘fact’ that we are machines is our inadequate
concept o f machine. He believes that we still think in terms of early machines that were
“simple devices” (1986). This line of thought is neatly linear and can be examined logically.
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Fact one: humans are machines; fact two: we don’t accept this because our concept of
machine is too narrow; fact three: we need expand our concept of machine from simple to
complex; then fact four: now “we’ll find more self-respect in knowing what wonderful
machines we are” (1986, p. 30). Machine is not viewed here as a metaphor at all; it is simply
what humans are. But Minsky has altered the process, or as Gadamer puts it, has changed
the relationship of speech and thought and removed the metaphoricity o f language. We can
even put Minsky’s assertions into valid syllogistic form, producing an argument he would,
no doubt, also view as sound.
All computers are machines
All humans are computers
Therefore, all humans are machines.
This logic may be difficult to argue with unless we examine the premises closely. Where do
they come from? All the premises are metaphors.
The metaphoricity of language does not easily succumb. A careful look reveals what
Minsky has done with the machine metaphor and how what he has done corresponds with
Gadamer’s observation that the altered relationship o f word and sign forms the basis of
concept formation in science. Minsky sees humans literally as machines, and yet that concept
continues to interact with the machine metaphor in the “constant process of concept
formation” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 429).
In Black’s interactive view, the metaphor o f “the human machine” would call
humans the primary subject and machine the secondary. Machine, as the secondary subject
is to be regarded as a system and aspects o f that system apply to the primary subject. The
hearer makes connections between machines (as systems) and humans. An extension of
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which I believe to be essential, Black considered early on, but later found “in retrospect to
be needlessly paradoxical” (1990, p. 59). This extension would include considering the
primary subject as a system also. The primary subject, humans, as a system compared to
machines would then yield greater connections.
One aspect of comparison, not yet discussed, is the consideration of dissimilarities
as well as similarities. In other words, it is not enough to compare one thing with another
and think about how they are alike; contrast is vital. We may, at times, gain greater insights
from, or enhance our concepts by, examining how the primary and secondary subjects in a
metaphor differ from each other. Recognition of difference can help us avoid literalizing
metaphors.
But clearly this is not what Minsky is doing. He has literalized the statement “man
is a machine” and, interesting enough, has used the reciprocal nature of metaphor and
literalized the reverse comparison with the notion that “machines are human.” Metaphoric
connections with humans as systems may include, but are not limited to, the activity of the
brain. However, Minsky severely limits humans when he says that “Minds are simply what
brains do” (1986, p. 287) and brains are just computers. Even in reversing the metaphoric
subjects, he reduces and literalizes them, thus creating a relationship of identity. By asserting
identity, Minsky denies any relevant differences between machines and humans, tacitly
commanding us to limit our ideas about human cognition to how computers word.
What are the consequences o f this instrumentalization o f the language process? By
altering or reifing words into signs, taking the living metaphoricity out o f language, we
change not only the relationship between speech and thought; we change our relationship
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with ourselves. If metaphoricity is to language as Bergson's elan vital is to life, then the
removal of metaphoricity from language is the removal of its life force. By defining humans
as machines, we separate humanity from life.
METAPHORICAL THINKING
Gregory Bateson says that “Life, perhaps, doesn't always ask what is logically
sound” (1987, p. 45). In examining metaphor as a way o f thinking and contrasting it to
formal logic, Bateson looks at the difference between two syllogistic forms. The traditional
or Socratic syllogism —Men die. Socrates is a man. Socrates will die — is of course what
I used to describe what Minsky has done with the machine metaphor. Bateson says that this
however, may not be how life works. The Socratic syllogism is “a most elegant tool for the
description of lineal systems of causation” (1987, p. 43). However, biological life, is not so
simple. It is filled with nonlinear patterns, “circular causal systems and recursive systems
[that] generate the paradoxes” (p. 43).
The Socratic syllogism is based on the classification of subjects. Socrates is a man
and as such, a member of a class. Members of that class die, therefore Socrates will die. This
form can only use linear relations. But Bateson, as a biologist, asserts that biological life
works more like the following syllogism:
Grass dies.
Men die.
Men are grass.
This type of syllogism, known as affirming the consequent, is thoroughly rejected by
logicians. ‘The grass syllogism is concerned with the equation o f predicates .... that which
dies is equal to that other thing which dies” (Bateson, 1987, p. 45). This is metaphorical
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thinking; a kind o f thinking that Bateson says is the way he thinks and hardly foreign to
biology. Shared predicates between life forms is what zoologists call homology. Bateson
says that “it became evident that metaphor was not just pretty poetry, it was not either good
or bad logic, but was in fact the logic upon which the biological world has been built, the
main characteristic and organizing glue o f this world o f mental process” (p. 46).
It is via metaphorical thought that new, different, and, as Aristotle says, “hidden
resemblances” are found and made. Linear logic can only analyze what we know. It can tell
us more precisely. It narrows things down and tidies them up. It is not messy; it is not
generative; it is not creative; it is not alive -- those are the realms o f metaphorical thought.
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES
Where does metaphor fit into Bruner's two modes o f thought? Metaphors can be
aligned with the narrative; however, a metaphor can also bridge the gap between one mode
and another. As stated earlier, we can reduce thought to two modes only in the broadest,
most generalizable sense. Metaphors are not the same as metaphorical thinking, rather they
generate and are generated by that process. Metaphorical thought is dynamic and often
occurs on a preconscious or unconscious level where we grapple to make connections.
Particle physicist and Anglican priest, John Polkinghome, says “our conscious minds
are counterbalanced by an unconscious component, at once creative, chaotic and teeming
with symbol” (1986, p. 5). Can we use this as a metaphorical statement to make connections
between physics and thought —a connection between quantum and classical physics, and
conscious and unconscious thought? The quantum world, according to the Heisenberg
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle, is not the same as our everyday world. It is filled
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with paradoxes, where things are and are not something simultaneously. Light is a wave
and/or a particle, not either just one or the other.
Metaphors and metaphorical thought are vital because therein lies the capacity to
envision a thing as, and not as, something simultaneously. Men are grass. Taken literally,
the statement is absurd; understood metaphorically it opens the door into a whole realm of
dynamic connections. The equations o f predicates - verbs - is metaphorical and dynamic,
involving action, movement, change, life. As Aronowitz and Giroux put it, “we need
theories that express and articulate difference, but we also need to understand how the
relations in which differences are constituted operate as part of a wider set of social, political
and cultural practices” (1991, p. 62).
Merchant (1980) and Peacocke (1986) tell us something o f the power o f metaphor
and methodology in shaping our understanding of the world. The machine metaphor is the
“structural model for Western ontology and epistemology” (Merchant, 1980, p. 227). The
analytic procedure critical for the work o f physical biochemists and molecular biologists
“becomes almost unconsciously a philosophical belief about biological organisms being
‘nothing but’ the bits into which they have analyzed them” (Peacocke, 1986, p. 7). This
“nothing buttery” is a rather natural transition from methodology to philosophy and occurs
without reflection. Just such a process happens when Minsky reduces humans to machines
and the epistemology is “nothing but” mechanistic.
There is no awe in reductionism. Thomas Berry (1992) says we must go beyond
measurement and quantitative terms. If you reduce a symphony to notes and notes to
vibrations, you lose the music.
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In order to develop fully the possibilities of human thought—logical, metaphorical,
narrative—we must think about our thinking about the world. Our world views need to be
explicit. When brought clearly into focus, we can reflect upon and examine both our
thinking and our doing. Returning to the tapestry metaphor, let us remember that tapestries
are woven from the back. This is similar to lived experience inasmuch as in the midst of an
experience we cannot see the life story we are in the process of constructing. We must step
back or metaphorically go around to the front and view it from a different perspective.
‘Mental processes and views of life cannot be separated from physical location [and]
our ‘world view’ as a conceptual framework depends quite literally on our view of the world
from a physical place in the universe?” (White, 1987, p. 3). The significance of White's
statement is easy to see when we think about the enormous shift in thinking that occurred
(and was strongly resisted) when Copernicus revealed our planetary system is heliocentric
rather than earth centered. The universe had not changed. What occurred was a “shift of
perception ... [that] amounts to drawing new meanings and patterns out of evidence that has
always been interpreted in other ways” (Harmon and Rheingold, 1984, p. 186). What new
metaphors accompany new perceptions? How does our philosophical, cosmological
perspective change when the earth is viewed from space and called ‘the big blue marble?’
Views —pictures, scenes, vistas and beliefs, ideas — are literal and metaphorical
aspects o f reality. Engagement in both is essential, but they create a tension that must be
held and balanced. We look at one aspect, we look at the other, all the while resisting the
urge to see them as either one thing or the other. “There is an integral relationship between
the kinds o f knowledge claims that we can make in a particular society and the quality of

that society” (Mumby, 1993, p. 2). Knowledge claims pretending certainty and fact, ignore
tension and contingency. Such a society is lifeless, without awe or hope, without meaning
or purpose. If we are to have a society beyond mere measurement and quantitative terms,
all modes of thought are indispensable. As Dewey puts it, “the process of education is the
main business of life” (1948/1957, p. 184). Life, education is not an issue of “a difference
o f quantity, but what kind o f person one is to become, what sort o f self is in the making,
what kind of world is making” (1922/1930, p. 217). The quality o f a tapestry resides, not
in its measurements, but in the integrity of the weaving.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE MANDELBROT SET.
Root metaphor for a postmodern theory of education

There is a contemporary philosophic movement, popularly known as
pragmatism, which, discontented with the current separation of theory
and practice, knowledge and action, regards thought and the beliefs which
proceed from it as themselves modes o f action and strives to envisage
them in their directive office in conduct. (Dewey, 1931, p. 299)

In the Introduction to this dissertation, I wrote that the concept of either/or thinking
would be central, and addressed the need to think in terms of both/and. This same theme
o f avoiding dualisms is a pivotal one in John Dewey’s work. The quotation above is a
concise summary o f his deep concern with the separations that emerge when either/or
thinking dominates —theory is separated from practice, knowledge from action. The extent
o f his concern is demonstrated in the titles o f so many of his works: The Child and the
Curriculum: School and Society: Democracy and Education: Philosophy and Civilization:
Experience and Education, to list just a few.
The issue of overcoming dualisms is a major part o f the educational theory I
generate using the Mandlebrot set as root metaphor. A fundamental idea upon which I base
my theory is that education is all one with the process of living. An educative or miseducative “experience occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and
environing conditions is involved in the very process of living” (Dewey, 1934/1980, p. 35).
This idea is expanded as my theory unfolds. I begin with some general characteristics o f the
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Mandlebrot set fractal to ensure the reader’s familiarity with a few o f the basic concepts.
Other aspects of the metaphor are explicated and explored as I develop the theory in greater
detail. Benoit Mandelbrot says that one reason geometry is frequently depicted as dry and
cold “lies in its inability to describe the shape o f a cloud, a mountain, a coastline, or a tree.
[But] clouds are not spheres, mountains are not cones, coastlines are not circles, and bark
is not smooth, nor does lightning travel in a straight line” (1983, p. 1). Circles, cones, and
straight lines are defined by Euclidean geometry and made manifest in human artifacts. We
build houses and cathedrals with Euclidean forms. But Mandelbrot points out that the
patterns that “Nature exhibits [are] not simply a higher degree but an altogether different
level of complexity. The number o f distinct scales of length o f natural patterns is for all
practical purposes infinite” (p. 1). In order to deal with this reality, Mandelbrot originated
and developed a “new geometry of nature” for which he coined the word fractal. Fractals
are geometric shapes that are complex and detailed in structure at any level o f magnification
and tend toward self-similarity. Fractals occur in nature as clouds, coastlines, ferns,
mountains and so on, or fractals can be generated mathematically. The Mandelbrot set is a
mathematical fractal produced by a non-linear equation, and visually generated by
computers. This fractal is particularly useful as a root metaphor because o f several
distinctive characteristics.
The equation that produces the Mandelbrot is amazingly simple —X2 + C. C is any
constant. There are two things to understand here. The first is the idea of iteration, whereby
the same process is repeated over and over and over. With a computer this can be done
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millions of times per minute. The iterations occur by taking the solution to the equation as
the next X value. For instance, zero is used as the ‘seed’ o f starting for X. If 1 is used for
C then X„2+ 1 = 0 + 1 = 1. Thus 1 becomes X,. Therefore, X,2 = C = 1 + 1 = 2. Likewise,
X22 + C = 22 + 1 = 4 + 1 = 5. The equation is thus iterated over and over again, where by
each solution becomes the next X value —X3, X4, X5, .... With just a few iterations of C =
1, the X values increase so rapidly they go toward infinity rather quickly.
The second idea to understand is that the list of all X values is known as the orbit
of zero because zero is used as the starting point of X. If C = 1, the orbit o f X is infinity. If
another number such as -1 is used for C, something quite different happens. X02 = 0, X, =
-1, X2 = 0, X3 = -1, Xt = 0 , very quickly we see a pattern whereby the X values alternate
back and forth from 0 to -1 and back to 0. This is called a period 2 orbit because the X
values alternate between just two points. Other numbers for C produce different patterns
or orbits o f zero. Some tend to center around a single fixed point, others have orbits or
periods o f 3, 4, 5, ..., 13, ..., 21, and others go to infinity. The Mandelbrot set [Figure 1]
depicted in black, is a graphic picture of all the C values for which the orbit o f zero does not
go to infinity. Therefore everything black is inside the set and has some finite orbit o f zero.
Everything outside the set, represented by various colors are C values that go to infinity
with varying degrees of rapidity. Rapidity refers to how many iterations occur before the C
values begin moving toward infinity. Differences in colors indicate how rapidly the C values
move toward infinity. Because the density of the graphing and its generation on a computer,
the complexity can be viewed by looking at various points at different levels of
magnification.
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When viewed as a whole, the Mandelbrot set appears as a black shape that is
basically circular with an indentation on one side and a smaller circular protrusion on the
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Figure 1
The Mandelbrot Set. The large black circle on the right contains C values that tend to
a fix e d point. The smaller black circle ju st to the left, contains C values that tend to an
orbit o f period 2. The still smaller black circle further to the left, contains C values o f
period 3. Everything outside the black areas contain C values that tend toward infinity.
The difference in colors indicate how rapidly the values move toward infinity. Rapidity
means that few er iterations occur before the c values begin moving toward infinity.
other. Extending from all edges are similar protrusions or ‘warts’ so that at first glance
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the repeating pattern o f circles with warty protrusions can be easily perceived. (Using a
little imagination, the black area resembles some of the fish found inhabiting the oceans at
extraordinary depths. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I will call this black shape a fish.)
If any V edge, that is, where a larger circle touches a smaller one, is pinpointed for
magnification, the image changes dramatically with each additional magnification at the
same point [Figures 2, 3], Curls and seahorses emerge. Yet with sufficient magnification,

Figure 2

Figure 3

two black circles with warty protrusions —a fish —re-emerges as another image embedded
in the overall pattern [Figure 4].

Figure 4
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The principle of self-similarity in linear mathematics means that a repeating pattern
can be precisely predicted because the recursion will be identical. In non-linear mathematics,
however, the similarity is not identity but resemblance; metaphors are resemblances, not
identities. When Benoit Mandelbrot began examining the set very closely, he found that even
with greater magnification none of the recurring patterns precisely matched any other. “In
fact, no part of the set exactly resembles any other part, at any magnification” (Gleick, 1987,
p. 228). The general patterns recur and are “always similar, never identical, fulfilling some
mandate of infinite variety, a miracle of miniaturization in which every new detail was sure
to be a universe of its own, diverse and entire” (p. 228-229). As we delve deeper and deeper
into the set, we see fish again and again but they are never duplicates [Figures 5-8],

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure 8
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To understand a little more clearly what we see when we view different fish, return
to Figure 1. This is the whole Mandelbrot set with the largest circle containing C values that
tend to a fixed point making the orbit o f zero period 1. The circle to the left is period 2, the
C values making an orbit between 2 points. The ‘wart’ or circle even further left is period
3. Figure 9, below, is that period 3 ‘wart’ at greater magnification. Extending from the
period 3 ‘wart’ is a branching ‘antenna.’ Period 3 has three branches to its antenna. The
branches are counted from the junction point just beyond the black area. In each fish
anywhere in the set the same is true. If a fish has a period 7 ‘wart’ it will have 7 branches
to the antenna; period 13 ‘warts’ have 13 branches. That is, the C values in the third largest
black area of a fish have a corresponding number of branchings.

Figure 9
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Looking at the main or largest circle of the Mandelbrot set [Figure 1] with its C
values of orbit 1, we notice the largest protrusion to the left is, as stated, period 2. This in
turn gives rise to a period 3 which we just viewed [Figure 9], However, if we examine the
other smaller and smaller ‘warts’ that protrude from the period 1 circle, they are period 3,
4 ,..., 9,... ,12, 13 .... We can discover this by magnifying enough to count the branching
‘antenna.’ If we continue around the circle where we magnify the V area between the period
1 and period 2 circles, the periods of each ‘wart’ continue to increase. We find both an
increase in numbers and in complexity.

Figure 11
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Keeping in mind the concept of both/and thinking, and the Mandelbrot set metaphor,
I examine theories and how they develop. In 1942 Stephen Pepper first published World
Hypotheses, a work that put forth what he calls the “root-metaphor theory” (1942/1970,
p. 85). This theory posits all philosophic thought as grounded in or developing from root
metaphors. Pepper says that when people are perplexed, they look around for some analogy
to connect the present problematic situation and their past experience. The philosopher may
bring greater intentionality and a broader question regarding the nature of the universe to
this process, but nevertheless is doing the same thing. Whatever appears to be the best
example for how things are becomes the root metaphor. The individual then analyzes the
example or metaphor, “selects its structural elements, and generalizes them as guiding
concepts for a world hypothesis” (1982, p. 199). Thus the concepts connected with the root
metaphor become “the set o f categories of [the] world hypothesis” (1982, p. 199).
Pepper takes virtually all enduring schools of Western philosophy, traces their
development, and places them into what he says are the four “relatively adequate
hypotheses.” Each world hypothesis has a root metaphor and adequacy depends on how
well the hypothesis deals with all facts whatsoever. He says that none of the world
hypotheses are completely adequate —two lack scope but have precision, the other two lack
precision but have scope.
The four world hypotheses Pepper uses and their root metaphors are:
formism/similarity; mechanism/machine; contextualism/the historical event (context); and,
organicism/organism and integration. Though he finds each of the four relatively adequate,
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Pepper says, “We need all world hypotheses, so far as they are adequate, for mutual
comparison and correction of interpretative bias” (1942/1970, p. 101). This is an echo from
Chapter Three where Me Closky (1990) pleads for all four elements o f the rhetorical tetrad
to balance the immoderation o f any single element.
My reasons for examining Pepper’s work are threefold. First, his notion o f root
metaphors undergirding world theories has become an extremely important addition to the
endeavor of understanding the formation o f theories of any kind. Second, even though he
compresses all of Western philosophy into four hypotheses, in so doing he focuses on the
need for both scope and precision, as well as analysis and synthesis. None o f the world
hypotheses have more than two of these characteristics. And third, by choosing a
postmodern root metaphor for my own theory of education I can utilize his four hypotheses
to examine education, not eclectically, but using different metaphors in turn, to view the
world from a both/and framework rather than simply an either/or position which necessarily
becomes exclusive.
Pepper pleads for thinkers to avoid eclecticism because it draws pieces from
hypotheses with differing root metaphors resulting in an incompatible or inconsistent
mixture. Dewey (1938/1963) also warns against eclecticism. But Dewey and Pepper voice
concerns about eclecticism that emerge from very different frames. Pepper, using an
either/or frame or mode o f thought, sees either a single metaphor or an inconsistent mix.
Dewey says that the task of an intelligent theory is that it must proceed “from a level deeper
and more inclusive than is represented by the practices and ideas of the contending parties”
(1938/1963, p. 5). We should not choose one side or the other, compromise with a via
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media, or “make an eclectic combination of points” (p. 5). Root metaphors represent a
deeper and more inclusive level, and the concept o f both/and thinking not only allows for
more than one root metaphor to organize our understanding of the world, but points to the
necessity of multiple metaphors. However, this is not a prescription for inconsistency.
Pepper rightly points out that incompatibility comes from choosing points from differing
root metaphors, but fails to understand the possibility of using more than one metaphor with
the attendant organizing structures of each.
Pepper says that in Art as Experience. Dewey “produces a contextualist-organistic
eclecticism (1942/1970, p. 147). Dewey (1939) rejects Pepper's criticism as another
misinterpretation of his work. Pepper misunderstands Whitehead as well, and I believe for
the same reason. He says, “I do think Whitehead’s theory must objectively be taken as an
eclectic one. But it is perhaps an eclecticism with the germ o f a quite new type o f world
hypothesis generating in it” (Pepper, 1967, p. 6). Both Dewey and Whitehead in different
ways pre-figure postmodern ideas through their employment o f new order concepts. Dewey
wrote Experience and Education (1938/1963) in a clarifying vein primarily to address issues
of confusion and conflict between traditional and progressive theories of education. After
stating that an intelligent theory must proceed from “a level deeper and more inclusive than
is represented ... by the contending parties,” while avoiding eclecticism, he says that, “it
means the necessity of the introduction of a new order of conceptions leading to new modes
of practice” (p. 5). The Mandelbrot set is generated out o f a new order o f conceptions.
That short phrase —“a new order of conceptions —is fundamental to understanding
what Dewey is about. Either/or thinking is an old order concept and is highly restrictive;
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everything is understood in terms of analysis or synthesis, wholes or parts, cause and effect.
Pepper, caught in either-or categorizing and unable to fit either Dewey or Whitehead into
existing hypotheses, chooses the only known alternative —eclecticism. This is not surprising
when Pepper’s Concept and Quality (1967) reveals that the “new” hypothesis Pepper is
proposing is really a form of old line behaviorism. He calls it selectivism with the root
metaphor “the purposive act,” apparently missing its deeper atomistic roots in mechanism.
Postmodern concepts are like Doll’s description of post-modem art and architecture.
He says they are “Janus-faced, indicating a present entwined with its past and future” (1993,
p. 8). Implicit in his statement is a difference in the concept of time from the modernist linear
notion of past|present|future —separate, lined-up, facing the same direction. This new order
concept doesn’t simply turn the faces in both directions simultaneously. There is also an
intertwining that is difficult to represent —pastSpresentSfiiture; there exists within the
present both a pointing toward and an embedding in, the past and future simultaneously.
Postmodern concepts, like postmodern science, always keep relationship as an essential
aspect of the concept. Time is not merely separable into the past, the present, and the future
as if time were merely isolated bits. Rather, time is viewed as both that which can be
separated out for specific purposes and the interrelationships of that time to its past and
future. For instance, the 1920s as a time period is related to and to some degree constituted
by the past and to some degree constructs the future. Also, the past and possibilities for the
future are necessarily part of what constitutes the 1920s. The embedded interrelatedness of
p a s tS p re se n ts future, is similar to the embedded interrelationships o f all the fish in the
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Mandelbrot set. They may be looked at and examined separately but are inextricably
connected to one another and the whole by threads that are often unseen.
One o f the greatest difficulties in expressing new ideas or concepts is the limits
imposed by existing language. Mandelbrot needed to coin a new term, fractals, and develop
an entire geometry to explain his thoughts. Whitehead did much the same in Process and
Reality (1929/1978) where he coins new words. Dewey, on the other hand, in pragmatic
fashion, used existing terminology to express himself. Without new markers to alert the
reader’s attention to the radical nature o f his ideas, Dewey is often m/sunderstood, while
Whitehead is simply not understood. Michael Elderidge (e-mail conversation, Dec. 1995)
says that Dewey uses “conventional language in unconventional ways.” Conventional
readings of Dewey from within an either/or frame have produced two main types of opinions
regarding his work. One view of his work portrays him as tremendously inconsistent
because he does not strictly adhere to linear categories and exclusively analytic rules; those
of this opinion dismiss him altogether. The other view, focusing heavily on method,
embraces him enthusiastically, not troubled by what does not fit neatly together. Ironically,
their interpretation of his method represents two extremes. When focus is on method alone,
Dewey can be read as either a linear, step-by-step empiricist adhering closely to the scientific
method, or as a “progressive” who wants few and flexible rules. Both are extremes against
which Dewey fought (1929/1954; 1938/1963). But Dewey isn’t either o f these; he is neither
inconsistent nor a methodist. To begin to understand what he is really about requires a
position beyond either/or thinking where we can explore his ideas that don’t fit neatly into
old order categories. Dewey says, “For whatever else pragmatism is or is not, the pragmatic
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spirit is primarily a revolt against that habit o f mind which disposes of anything whatever —
even so humble an affair as a new method in Philosophy —by tucking it away, after this
fashion, in the pigeon holes of a filing cabinet” (1910, p. iv). Pigeon holes in a filing cabinet
makes a nice metaphor for the paradigmatic mode of thought.
Thus far two metaphors, tapestry and the Mandelbrot set, have been used to explore
ideas about life and education. Why did I move from tapestry, an object that is familiar, to
one that is not familiar, the Mandelbrot set? There are several reasons for the change. One
metaphor cannot hold or exhibit all ideas. Mixing metaphors rather than adding new ones
results in the kind of eclecticism that both Pepper and Dewey disdained. Dewey’s use of
conventional language in unconventional ways results in misunderstandings because his
interpreters do not always realize that what he is saying is truly new. Tapestry as a
traditional object, can become a conventional metaphor. Whereas the Mandelbrot set
requires the reader to think new thoughts. The newness o f the metaphor places greater
demands on the process of reflection. However, connections between the two metaphors
help us to bridge gaps that may exist between the familiar and the unfamiliar, allowing us
to better understand the new.
Kliebard utilizes the notion of root metaphor in theory development when he says,
“a large part of what we call theory consists of the effort to extend by analogy
understandings, concepts, and explanations that exist in one domain over to another” (1992,
p. 208). He does not equate metaphors and theories but says that “it can be argued that
metaphors and theories have in common the effort to organize thinking by setting in motion
an interaction between the familiar and/or the comprehensible on one hand and the thing to

be explained on the other” (p. 208). Nagel says that theories differ from metaphors in that
theories can be understood as “any more or less systematic analysis of a set o f related
concepts” (1969, p. 10). If metaphor is the root of analysis, then theory is the explication.
In other words, when the metaphor is examined for structural or systemic elements and
these are generalized, a theory begins to emerge. Just as some theories are more or less
accurate than others, some metaphors may be trivial or profound, useless or generative. And
both theories and metaphors have the potential to be misleading, as Bowers and Flinders,
in Responsive Teaching (1990), point out. Dewey, as a pragmatist, says a philosophy that
chooses “the work o f projecting hypotheses for the education and conduct o f mind,
individual and social, is thereby subjected to test by the way in which the ideas it propounds
work out in practice” (1910, p. 18). Is the Mandelbrot set a good metaphor for a
postmodern theory o f education? Will the application o f that theory in Chapter Five
demonstrate its ability to generate intelligent actions that lead to positive consequences?
The OED gives the etymology of theory from the Greek theorem meaning a looking
at, viewing, contemplation. Drawing on the Greek, Kliebard says that, “a theory, therefore,
in its root meaning, may be construed as a way o f seeing — but, it may be argued, a
particular way; it is a way of seeing one thing as if it were another” (1992, p. 205). Kliebard
in using a more inclusive sense o f the term theory, one rooted in its historical meaning,
moves beyond the restrictions o f the modem fixed sense o f theory as specific and highly
systematic, to a more metaphorical understanding. Kliebard’s definition o f theory therefore,
allows us to understand Pepper’s world hypotheses or world theories, as four distinct ways
of seeing the world via their root metaphors. This is to say that we organize our conceptions
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of the world according the structural features of the root metaphors we use. Sometimes we,
as Pepper does, believe our root metaphors to be reality itself. However, metaphors and
theories are only ways to organize, they are not descriptions of reality.
What metaphors form the roots o f Dewey’s ideas? In accusing Dewey of being an
organic-contextualist, Pepper identifies two metaphors that might be connected with
Dewey’s thought — organism (integration) and historical event (context). Yet, as a
predecessor of post-modern thought, there can be no single metaphor to adequately express
Dewey’s concepts of growth and education. At first glance, organism would seem to have
possibilities. However, Dewey points out that when some o f Hegel’s followers tried “to
reconcile the claims of the Whole and of individuality by the conception o f society as an
organic whole, or organism” (1916/1966, p. 60) this created another problem. The social
organism was “interpreted after the relation o f the organs of the body to each other and to
the whole body” (p. 60) which meant that each organ or part of the body has a particular
function, such that a hand is, and can only be, a hand. “The notion of ‘organism’ is thus used
to give a philosophic sanction to class distinctions in social organization” (p. 60) much like
Plato’s sense o f individuals having a pre-ordained place in the fixed world order. This
contrasts with an understanding o f the importance of each part to the functioning of the
whole without privileging some parts over others. Ecology and ecosystem as words that
imply interrelationships and interdependence —concepts of primary importance to Dewey —
are more generative metaphors. Balance is essential for ecosystems to flourish and for
Dewey “one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy o f education has to cope
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is the method of keeping a proper balance between ... [various] modes of education”
(1916/1966, p. 9).
Robert Bellah and his coauthors use the term “social ecology” to express the idea
of our fundamental embeddedness within society (Bellah et al. 1985), an idea consistent with
Dewey’s notion that it is only within a social context that we become fully human
(1916/1966). Pepper’s second metaphor is the historic event or context by which, he says,
pragmatists “mean the event alive in the present” (1942/1970, p. 232). This is more than
basic context; it is the continuing life story. For Bellah, social ecology refers to a community
with a shared history; a community constituted by its narrative. Perhaps narrative or story
is a useful metaphor for Dewey even though he does not use either term. But this concept
is implicit in his insistence of the folly of generalized notions about humanity. He says,
“‘individual’ is not [just] one thing, but is a blanket term for the immense variety o f specific
reactions, habits, dispositions and powers of human nature that are evoked, and confirmed
under the influences of associated life” (1920/1948, p. 199-200). The same problem adheres
to the term social. “Society is one word, but infinitely many things. It covers all the ways
in which by associating together [humans] share their experiences, and build up common
interests and aims” (p. 200). He says this includes everything from street gangs, to trade
unions, to villages and international alliances. And this can be adequately expressed only
through story —the telling of their particular and constitutive narratives. And “the stories
lives tell” as Witherell and Noddings (1991) put it, require multiple metaphors for the
multifaceted nature of life.
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What structures or aspects of the Mandelbrot set metaphor can I use for developing
my theory — ones that avoid the dualism of separating theory from practice —and allow
for the multi-facets of Dewey’s ideas? One characteristic relates to the different levels of
magnification and what these levels can represent. If one looks at Figures 12, 15 and 17
without either familiarity with what is being viewed or an explanation of how they are
related, there is no way to understand them as being different levels o f magnification of the
same set. It would be somewhat like looking at a picture of a sheep in Figure 12, a sheep’s
liver in Figure 15, and a liver cell in Figure 17 and having no experience of biology. Without
an understanding of the relationship among such items, the pictures would make little sense.

Figure 12

Figure 17
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Dewey says that there is a “constant task ... to establish working connections between old
and new subject-matters. We cannot lay hold o f the new, we cannot even keep it before our
minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and knowledge we already posses”
(1929/1958, p. viii-ix). When we have the intervening pictures [Figures 13, 14, and 17], or
explanations of how Figures 12, 15, and 17 are related, the gap in our understanding
narrows. ‘The greater the gap, the greater the disparity between what has become a familiar
possession and the traits presented in new subject-matter, the greater is the burden imposed
upon reflection; the distance between old and new is the measure of the range and depth of
the thought required” (p. ix.). However, if the gap is too large, that is, intermediate
information for generating connections between Figures 12 and 17 is not available, then no
amount of thought will close that gap. When we have Figures 12-17 to view together, the
relationships among Figures 12, 15, and 17 are readily seen, gaps are closed through the
visual connections making new information more easily accessible.
At this point, a distinction needs to be made between the traditional cross-sectional
examination of an entity or situation and multiple levels of magnification of a fractal. With
a cross-section you have only that, a single piece intentionally separated out from the whole
for examination. With a microscope, even an electron microscope, one is able to examine
only that particular piece or section at various degrees o f magnitude. The entity itself is
elsewhere, isolated from the piece under examination. With the Mandelbrot set however,
one can zoom into and out of differing degrees of magnitude without being cut-off from the
entire set. Different levels and patterns can be examined within the context of the whole.

Figure 12

Figure 13

Figure 17

Figure 14

Figure 16

Figure 15

Life, which includes education as all one with the process of living, is like the entire
Mandelbrot set. Stating that education is like the complete Mandelbrot must not be
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construed as an argument for holism. Pepper makes the point about the theories he examines
that two are analytic and reductionistic in nature and that two others are synthetic and
holistic. Reductionism and holism are both needed for a well developed understanding of
education, life, the world, but each must be employed within an applicable domain.
Otherwise, both holism and reductionism can become forms of blindness, which certainly
won’t do if theories are ways of seeing. For example, somewhere around the age of one
year, normal human infants move from predominantly perceiving the world by touch to
primary reliance on sight. The physician Paul Brand relates the experiences o f Marius von
Senden with sixty-six patients who were blind from birth and later received their sight
through surgery. One of the greatest difficulties of the newly sighted was “mastering such
advanced concepts as spatial wholeness, or two-dimensional depth perception” (Brand and
Yancy, 1984, p. 156). A girl, after receiving her sight “realized that she had never conceived
of her dog as a whole, made up o f a head, ears, and legs joined together to make one animal.
Like the proverbial blind men feeling an elephant, she had never touched all the parts at once
and thus had not pictured the dog as a whole being” (p. 156). When we conceptualize only
parts, we suffer a kind o f blindness that does not allow insights o f wholeness. If we look
only at Figures 12,15, and 17 o f the Mandelbrot set, without a sense o f wholeness, we are
unable see how they are connected to the entire set. When we examine aspects of education
separately from life, we encounter the same problem.
Holism can be a form o f blindness as well. As the never sighted cannot conceive of
spatial wholeness, holism can induce us to lose sight of the parts and their interrelations.
Frank White (1987) describes the experience o f twenty-four astronauts and cosmonauts as
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they traveled away from the planet. When they reached a distance from earth where they
could no longer see distinct geographic features, their perceptions began to change. When
neither continents nor oceans were distinguishable, earth was perceived as a whole. This is
now known as the “overview effect.” This effect had a profound impact on most of the
astronauts. It both literally and metaphorically changed their point of view about their world.
They experienced a new realization of the artificial nature of national boundaries. Be that
as it may, due to this holistic view, they could no longer see the ravages of war and famine,
nor could they see the beauty of a flower or the complexity o f an ethnic culture in a market
square. The earth was homogenized. If we view education only as the fish image of the
Mandelbrot set, we are blind to the marvelous complexity embedded within.
EDUCATION AS THE MANDELBROT SET
What do I mean when I say that education is the entire Mandelbrot set? Dewey’s
numerous definitions of education are all related and reveal various aspects o f his
fundamental idea that the process of education is “the main business of life” (1948/1957, p.
184), a process which continues as long as life endures. He gives a technical and pragmatic
definition of education in Democracy and Education, stating that it is “that reconstruction
or reorganization o f experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which
increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience” (1916/1966, p. 76). Thus the
educational process is not something that can be separated from life experience. He says that
“the educative process [like life itself) is its own end, and the only sufficient preparation for
later responsibility comes by making the most of immediately present life” (1916/1966,
p.310). The focus is on experience now, not a preparation for some never-present future,
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forever just out of reach. He says that education is not “a preparation for something coming
later” (1948/1957, p. 184). However, in its “nowness,” education like the Mandelbrot set
has a recursive past and a yet to be explored (magnified?) future. Because Dewey sees all
experience as participating in the (educative) process o f living, he says, “Since growth is the
characteristic o f life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself’
(1916/1966, p. 53) -- nor does the Mandelbrot set.
One way to view the Mandelbrot set as education, in light o f my view that education
is contiguous with life, is to see the fish in figure 1 as a life, an individual. All the other fish
that appear at various levels of magnification can then represent that person in the various
settings or contexts o f life experiences. All the fish are similar yet none are exact copies
because, as Dewey says, “Every experience enacted and undergone modifies the one who
acts and undergoes ... [and] it is a somewhat different person who enters into [subsequent
experiences]” (1938/1963, p. 35). Each time a fish emerges it is surrounded by a variety of
images, different environments which may be understood as various contexts o f experience
-- different ages, places, roles, and so on. The fish might be observed in the center, at an
edge, or anywhere in between, and is always somewhat different in each context. The
Mandelbrot set as a whole, like life, is infinitely complex.
Using the Mandlebrot set to represent life elicits another feature o f the fractal
metaphor — the difference between complex, non-linear systems and simple, linear systems.
The difference is in relationship. Linear relations are proportional, predictable, and can be
expressed on a straight line graph. Linear systems are simple in their modularity; they can
be taken apart, and put back together, and all the pieces add up (Gleick, 1987). The
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Mandelbrot set, on the other hand, is non-linear. The relations within a non-linear system
are not proportional, and if added together, produce unpredictable results. As Gleick puts
it, “Nonlinearity means that the act of playing the game has a way o f changing the rules”
(1987, p. 24). That is, the patterns that emerge —fish, seahorses, octopi —all have different
foci as centers o f attraction, yet, all are connected. The rules change but are self-similar
because the same formula governs all the ‘sea-animals’ generated. This echoes Dewey’s
statement that the process of undergoing experience alters the one who undergoes the
experience, which o f course, also alters the context in which the experience is had. Each
human experience has a different focus as its center o f attraction, which in some way alters
all subsequent experiences. When we change the focus, we change the nature of the
experience and subsequent experiences.
Eveiy metaphor includes some things and excludes others. Tapestries may be more
complex than simple cloth but are linear constructions nonetheless. A change from the
tapestry metaphor to the Mandelbrot set allows us to move from linear to non-linear
concepts. However, we lose the pictorial narrative visible across the face o f the tapestry.
Living systems are non-linear and living systems include individual humans as well
as ecological or sociological systems. Non-linear equations have traditionally been relegated
to the Appendices of Math books as quirks of little interest or importance. Recognizing the
significance of non-linearity is a new order concept. Non-linearity does not fit neatly into
Newtonian mathematics and physics with laws of order and determinism. But the dynamics
o f life are not simply neat and orderly either. People, as individual living systems and as
parts of other living systems, because o f infinite complexity, have more in common with
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Mandlebrot sets than with machines. This is not to dismiss the linear aspects of life but to
state that they are contained within the whole. As Peacocke says, “life is generated out of
a combination of law and chance, determinism and randomness; a combination that is
inherently creative and involves an infinite increase in complexity” (1986, p. 97).
Fundamental to Dewey’s ideas regarding experience is what he calls the “principle
of continuity of experience” (1938/1963, p. 35). This principle states that all experience
occurs in such a way that something from past experience is brought into the present; the
past interacting with the present alters and shapes future experiences. In other words,
because some portion of the past is always brought into the present and these together affect
the future, there is continuity o f experience. He goes on to say that, “Growth, or growing
as developing ... is one exemplification o f the principle o f continuity” (p. 36).
Growth is a concept that Dewey uses to distinguish between educative experiences
and miseducative experiences. Growth is “cumulative movement of action toward a later
result” (1916/1966, p. 41). Though essential for educative experiences, growth is not
sufficient in itself. The “direction in which growth takes place, the ends toward which it
tends” (1938/1963, p. 30) are two criteria that help distinguish educative from miseducative
experience. Dewey says that one might grow in skill and mastery as a burglar, but this would
constitute miseducative experience, because for Dewey, “growing as education” must
promote growth in general, not just teach a specific skill, and must not cut the individual off
from growth in new directions. Dewey uses growth as a burglar as miseducative because
“education, in its broadest sense, is the means ... o f social continuity” (Dewey, 1916/1966,
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p. 2). To become a burglar, no matter how skilled, sets one outside the social milieu that
helps us become fully human. It closes many new directions for that individual’s future.
Two other aspects of experience, the passive and active characteristics, must both
be included for an educative experience to take place. Dewey calls the active aspect
“trying,” which carries a degree o f intentionality. The passive aspect, he calls undergoing,
which brings with it the consequences of the experience. The connections we make between
the active and passive ~ intent and consequences—are what give meaning to our experience.
If we make no connections, our experiences have no meaning for us. As with Figures 12,
15 and 17 o f the Mandelbrot set —the example of the sheep —without a connection there
is no meaning or understanding. Dewey says that, ‘The old takes on new color and meaning
in being employed to grasp and interpret the new” (1929/1958, p. ix). And James
Macdonald makes an even stronger case when he says that, “The fundamental human quest
is the search for meaning and the basic human capacity for this is experienced in the
hermeneutic process of interpretation ... This is the search (or research) for greater
understanding that motivates and satisfies us” (1995, p. 176).
A final criterion to examine for distinguishing educative from miseducative
experiences, is the interactivity between the individual and the environment. Dewey says the
interaction of these two constitutes a situation. If focus is placed solely on either the
individual (as romantic forms of progressivism did) or the environment (as behaviorists do)
rather than the situation itself, which contains both, integration o f experiences and the
relational development of connections will not take place. Life is lived situation to situation
and in order for these situations to generate educative growth, they must contain a sense of
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continuity with each other and prior experiences. Dewey says, “One situation becomes an
instrument o f understanding and dealing effectively with the situations which follow. The
process goes on as long as life and learning continue” (1938/1963, p. 44). Without such
relational interconnections, the process o f experiencing becomes one o f fragmentation. We
develop a sense o f separation and isolation and inhabit a world made up o f disparate and
ultimately alien parts. Dewey says that taken far enough, the division within the person will
produce insanity. “A fully integrated personality, on the other hand, exists only when
successive experiences are integrated with one another. It can be built up only as a world
of related objects is constructed” (p. 44). This sense of relationality —situation to situation
—has a pragmatic practicality to it (abduction) that the formal logic o f deduction and the
mathematical probability of induction lack. This relationality is that of lived life where the
experiences of life are reflected on. And the results of reflection “explain the primary
objects [of experience, and] enable us to grasp them with understanding, instead o f just
having sense-contact with them” (1929/1958, p. 5). This situational interconnectedness is
different in kind from the formal, part-whole relationality expressed in deduction and
induction. It is recursive. It bears analogous relations with the self-similarity expressed in
the Mandelbrot set. Each fractal examined is different from, yet similar to, the fractal from
whence it came and into which it will emerge or grow as the process of recursion continues.
To summarize, in order for experiences to be educative they must (1) involve
growing that promotes growth in general and in ways that allow us to regulate and choose
future directions, (2) they must have meaning for us, which is made possible by making
connections with various aspects of experience, and (3) they help to integrate more fully our
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personality by having both a continuity of experience and a continuity of meaning across
situations. The degree of educative significance will reside in the active union of continuity
and interaction —a union which can be a transformative process.
The characteristics needed for educative experiences just described do not happen
accidently. Intentionality must be brought to bear. Experience must be reconstructed or
reorganized to yield its fullest benefit — to be educative. “Thinking is a method of
reconstructing experience” (1948/1957, p. 141). Just as all growth is not educative, all
thinking is not either. Here Dewey is calling for reflective thinking, reflective knowledge,
reflective inquiry, thoughtful experience. This concept recursively brings us back to the
active or trying aspect o f experience.
Dewey describes the process o f reflection, a secondary level o f experience, as one
in which we step back from an experience and treat it as i f it were merely an external event.
From this new, but interconnected position, we are able to generate abstractions and
generalizations even though the individualizing aspects are still within us. “But we return
from abstractive thought to experience of them with added meaning and with increased
power to regulate our relations to them. Reflective knowledge is the only means of
regulation” (1929/1979, p. 219). This is how we learn from an experience and are
transformed by experience. ‘T o ‘learn from experience’ is to make a backward and forward
connection” (1916/1966, p. 140) between our actions and the consequences; between being
acted upon by the environment and our response or reaction. Each endeavor o f reflection
allows for the possibility of transforming experience and opens us to further reflection and
additional transformations in the directions of our choosing. Dewey’s concept o f reflection
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suggests the process of metaphoric thought. As stated in Chapter Four, metaphoric thought
is dynamic and often occurs on a preconscious or unconscious level where we grapple to
make connections. For this process to be strongly educative, it must be active in Dewey’s
sense of including intentionality.
The ideas of backward and forward connections, intentionality, and possibilities for
transformation can be linked to the Mandelbrot set. Because the images are generated by
computer, the full impact or depth of experience is only possible through an interactive or
video medium. When one area o f the screen displaying the fish is pinpointed, then magnified
again and again and again, a whole universe of beauty and unexpected complexity emerges.
When one returns to the original fish and pinpoints another area upon which to concentrate,
the images at greater and greater levels of magnification continue to have self-similar
patterns, but because o f the endless complexity, what is seen is always different, the same
yet unimaginably unique. The ‘stills’ included in this work cannot convey the sense of awe
that attend interactive explorations. The difference in quality o f experience is much like the
difference between seeing snapshots of an individual from infancy to adulthood, and the
lived experience of watching that person grow up. In order to view more than the original
fish, it is necessary to zoom into and out of various areas and at differing degrees of
magnitude. This zooming in and out, is a kind of backward and forward viewing by which
we begin to experience the complexity of the set. And what we find in each new level allows
us to choose in which subsequent direction to go. However, if we stay only in one place, or
at a single level of magnification, we are cut off from all other possible experiences.
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Dewey’s description of reflection brings us back to the root metaphor o f my theory.
As Kliebard says, “a theory ... may be construed as a way of seeing ... one thing as if it were
another” (1992, p. 205); metaphors are ways of seeing one thing as if it were another.
Above, I used the fish to represent an individual, the same individual at various times or in
differing environments. Another way to interpret the recurring pattern o f the fish is to let
each fish represent a different individual. There are two metaphoric aspects here. One is that
within the Mandelbrot set, at all the possible levels of magnification, there are an infinite
number of self-similar fish. Second, is the idea that even though self-similar, each is unique.
This metaphoric connection can help us realize that each individual has various ways of
seeing, organizing the world o f personal experiences, yet each of us tends toward a
particular, or favored mode. This is like the center o f attraction for each fractal fish. In the
classroom, we need to realize that each student is embedded within an environment that is
not entirely visible to us, and that environment to some degree is generated out of a center
of attraction -- her or his primary mode o f thought. An example may help clarify my point.
While observing a social studies methods student teach a lesson to a third grade class
as part of her course, the following incident occurred. The student prepared her lesson on
geographic mapping from the standardized Curriculum Guide used by the state. Her
objective was to teach the children about maps and how they convey information about
location. The specific geographic areas she used were the school at which the lesson took
place, the town in which the school was located, and the state in which the town was
located. In order to demonstrate the connections among these places, she drew a rough
circle on the board and told the students that circle represented their school. Next she drew
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a larger circle around the first one and said that was the town. Lastly, she drew a third, still
larger circle around the second one to represent the state. When finished, the image on the
board consisted o f three circles, one within the other.
She then asked the students to tell her what was on the board. One boy, Arthur,
raised his hand. When called upon, he said it looked like a basketball. Now Arthur is one of
those students who has a ‘reputation’ for making strange, inappropriate comments. The
student teaching the class responded with a frown and a non-committal nod of her head. She
immediately called on another child.
The questions I raise with my thoughts about metaphor are these: What was Arthur
talking about? Was Arthur using another mode of thought, another frame of reference, a
metaphor to try to make sense of what was happening? I was sitting just behind Arthur, and
from my position, I have to admit the drawing on the board more closely resembled a
basketball than any map I have ever seen.
Metaphors can be roots for theories. Theories can generate multiple metaphors.
Metaphors can be vehicles o f inquiry. Metaphors begin the process by which we construct
our understanding of new information or a view of the world. The Mandelbrot set, narrative,
story, ecology, ecosystems all have connections with the ideas presented here. How can
these metaphors generated from my theory be used in practice?

CHAPTER SIX

THEORY ©PRACTICE

There is no inherent opposition between theory and practice: the former
enlarges, releases and gives significance to the latter; while practice supplies
theory with its materials and with the test and check which keep it sincere
and vital. (Dewey, 1929/1954, p. 36)
A great man is not a man so strong that he feels less than other men; he is
a man so strong that he feels more. And when Nietzsche says, “A new
commandment I give to you, Be hard,” he is really saying, “A new
commandment I give to you, Be dead.” Sensibility is the definition o f life.
(Chesterton, 1905, p. 89)

If, as Dewey says, there is no inherent opposition between theory and practice, why
do so many theories fail in practice? Why is so much of practice inconsistent with theory?
These are enormous questions and Schwab and Dewey both provide sign posts that point
to why there is no facile, automatic connection between theory and practice. That is, there
is not necessarily an easy flowing out of practice from theory especially when theory turns
in on itself and is left unexamined. Schwab says, that “theoretical constructions are, in the
main, ill-fitted and inappropriate to problems o f actual teaching and learning. Theory, by its
very character, does not and cannot take account of all the matters which are crucial to
questions of what, who, and how to teach” (1978, p. 287). That is quite a forceful
statement, one that draws on the modernist use o f theory. He goes on to explain that
“theories cannot be applied as principles to the solution of problems concerning what to do
with or for real individuals, small groups, or real institutions located in time and space —the
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subjects and clients of schooling and schools” (p. 287). On the one hand, this is a surprising
comment from someone with roots in pragmatism. On the other hand, the context from
within which Schwab writes sheds some light on his statements as well as the whole issue
of theory/practice.
When Schwab wrote the preceding words, he also said, “the field o f curriculum is
moribund [because of] inveterate, unexamined, and mistaken reliance on theory” (1978, p.
287). He says that the curriculum field has adopted “theories (from outside the field of
education) ... and has used these borrowed theories theoretically, i.e. as principles from
which to ‘deduce’ right aims and procedures for schools and classrooms” (p. 287). An
unexamined reliance on theory is the heart of this problem, that is, the problem is not really
with theory itself so much as the narrow use of the term. Nor is the difficulty with principles,
which are necessarily grounded in one theory or another, but in the lack of reflection and
examination which allow gaps between theory and practice to occur unchecked.
Schwab’s concern is similar to that of Dewey in that both see the disastrous
consequences of separating theory from lived experience. Schwab’s concerns primarily focus
around theories, especially those in the 1970s that came directly from psychology into
education. These theories, emerging full-fledged from the laboratory into the classroom,
characterize an approach to theory that clings to the Greek root theorem, to view, where
the viewer is understood only in terms of spectator. These psychological theories were often
unexamined and yet were, as are all theories, based on certain assumptions. One assumption
of the behavioral theories was that what occurred in laboratory experiments, done primarily
with animals, would be directly applicable to classrooms. A closer examination of this
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underlying assumption reveals several other assumptions: the behavior o f humans is virtually
the same as that of animals (this is especially applicable to the notions of conditioning) and
classrooms are simply real life laboratories where experiments can be further tested. There
are of course, other assumptions that can be discovered by looking closer still —as with the
Mandelbrot set, a closer examination at greater magnification reveals what cannot otherwise
be seen. The point here is the need to examine carefully whatever theory or practice is at
hand.
Schwab’s concern is akin to Dewey’s. Dewey is troubled by the consequences of
separating theory and practice from each other and from life. He says the problem is not any
opposition between theory and practice but that “there is a whole lot of opposition between
human beings who set themselves up as practical and those who set themselves up as
theorists, an irresolvable conflict because both have put themselves into a wrong position”
(1929/1954, p. 36). This “wrong position” is dualistic and extreme. He says that the history
o f schools is like a pendulum swinging between two extremes, traditionalists and
progressives. He goes on to say that pendulum is not really an apt metaphor because o f two
things: first, most schools simply stay with one extreme and second, the metaphor “seems
to suggest that the solution lies in finding, a mid-point between the two extremes which
would be at rest. But what is really wanted is a change in the direction o f movement” (p.
33, emphasis added). This is very close to his call for “a new order of conceptions leading
to new modes o f practice” (1938/1963, p. 5) that we looked at in Chapter Five.
Why didn’t the “so-called advanced schools of educational thought” (1929/1954,
p. 37) flourish? One reason is because they were not generated out of the relationship
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between theory and practice Dewey describes, whereby theory “enlarges, releases and gives
significance to [practice]; while practice supplies theory with its materials and with the test
and check which keep it sincere and vital” (p. 36). This description of theory and practice
is so interactive — theory and practice are so interrelated — that it is hardly possible to
imagine a separation between the two. Dewey’s concept o f theory is o f a different order
from the modernist concept which privileges theory over, and separates it from, practice.
Viewing theoiy as superior to practice places theory on a meta level whereby theory easily
shifts from a set of principles about a particular phenomenon to a world view in which all
facts whatsoever are accounted for by using those same principles. Behaviorism is an
example; the stimulus-response theory expanded from an explanation o f the salivation
behaviors of Pavlov’s dogs to an explanation of all human behavior. Without Dewey’s idea
o f the test and check that practice supplies, behaviors that cannot be explained by the
stimulus-response theory are often dismissed or ignored by behaviorists. In a behavior
modification course I was required to take in my graduate counseling program, the
professor held a meta-behaviorist view. If a behavioral program did not result in expected
change, the program was assumed faulty. Likewise, if a behavior did not fit a stimulusresponse pattern, he faulted the observation of that behavior. Examination of the theory and
its universal application was rejected out of hand.
Dewey describes the theory of the “advanced schools” as in effect stating that what
is needed is for the teacher to surround students with interesting materials, supplies and so
on, and then remove him or herself from the context to allow the students the freedom to
respond according to their own desires. He says, “Now such a method is really stupid” (p.
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37). And it is stupid for two reasons. One, it is not possible, and two, “it misconceives the
conditions of independent thinking ... [because] there is no spontaneous germination in the
mental life.” (p. 37). He goes on to point out its inconsistency with the theory which
generates it. If the theory were correctly applied, the teacher would not supply any materials
because the selection and provision of materials by the teacher would “‘interfere’ with
personal freedom” (p. 37) of the student. Thus, by examining practice, “a test and check”
is done on the theory. In this instance it is easy to recognize a problem with the theory. This
method of examination can go the other way as well. The test of theory is whether and to
what degree it is able to “enlarge, release and give significance” to practice. If being
consistent with an educational theory does not even allow for the provision of materials, it
can hardly “enlarge” anything.
Dewey’s critique o f traditional approaches to education portray the teacher as the
sole “authority” who “dictates” and attempts to control all that occurs in the classroom. He
links this authoritarian and controlling approach with what he believes modern experimental
science has become —an art and theory of control. He sums up the modem world view as
one that
marks a revolution in the whole spirit of life, in the entire attitude taken
toward whatever is found in existence. When the things which exist around
us, which we touch, see, hear and taste are regarded as interrogations for
which an answer must be sought (and must be sought by means of deliberate
introduction of changes till they are reshaped into something different),
nature as it already exists ceases to be something which must be accepted
and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It is now something to be
modified, to be intentionally controlled. It is material to act upon so as to
transform it into new objects which better answer our needs. (1929/1979,
p. 100)
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One afternoon in 1993,1 was listening to a report on National Public Radio about
a secondary school in the Northeast that was implementing a new marketing strategy.
American businesses were finding it increasingly necessary to teach new employees basic
math and reading, skills that had formerly been required before receiving a high school
diploma. The school, interpreting itself as a “factory” that wanted to “produce” a “superior
product” decided to ‘cash in’ on the situation. The decision was made that the best way to
‘market’ their products in order for the factory to have its ‘highest possible yield’ was to
“guarantee” those products to the business community. The guarantee stated that “if the
product is defective in any way and needs remediation in any subject, the factory would take
it back and fix it at no cost to the business that employed said product.” That is quite a
guarantee, one most of us would no doubt like to have on items we purchase. However, as
a description of students —human beings as products of an educational factory, guaranteed
and repairable if defective —it is dehumanizing! Yet it fits Dewey’s description of the theory
of control marked by “a revolution in the whole spirit of life, in the entire attitude taken
toward whatever is found in existence,” (p. 100) flora or fauna, human and non-human
animals alike. These are not conditions that insure growth into full potential, these are
conditions that produce exactly the products of the machine metaphors used —students who
are viewed and view themselves mechanistically as products of a mechanized system. When
the model is machine, then the human, the personal is not only irrelevant but something to
be eliminated.
Such a mechanistic model is utterly incompatible with a theory o f democracy, a
concept founded in the notion o f interdependence. Dewey summarizes his own theory of
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democracy when he says, that “all social institutions have a meaning, a purpose. That
purpose is to set free and to develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to
race, sex, class or economic status. And this is all one with saying that the test of their value
is the extent to which they educate every individual into the full statue of his [or her]
possibility (1948/1957, p. 186). How does this happen? Through education because
“education means the enterprise of supplying the conditions which insure growth, or
adequacy of life” (1916/1966, p. 51)
What does it mean to engage in the enterprise of supplying the conditions which
insure growth and enable every individual to develop his or her full potential? How does it
differ from the factory model? Katherine Hayles says that “the world as humans experience
it is a collaboration between reality and social construction. No longer simply what is there,
reality is subject to constant revision, deconstruction, and reconstruction .... The
postmodern milieu does not necessarily cause articulations ... [of new ideas and theories].
Rather, it creates a context in which they become thinkable thoughts” (Hayles, 1991, p. 14).
It is just such a milieu that Dewey desired. He sought a context where a new order
o f conceptions and a different direction o f movement from the either/or pendulum of
extremes would provide the means for educative experiences. “For we live not in a finished
world, but in one which is going on” (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 151). Just such an environment
can be created through the use of metaphor where both/and thinking is explored and
developed. It can also provide a context whereby theory and practice can be evaluated and
understood in relation to one another.
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What might all of this look like in practice? How does it apply to those preparing to
teach, already teaching, and students in elementary through high school? What impact do
the metaphors used for models o f teaching and models for teachers have on those who
teach? How is practice always tied to metaphors? What new metaphors are needed in theory
and practice?
Ivor Goodson says that, “Life experiences and background are obviously key
ingredients of the person that we are, of our sense of self. To the degree that we invest our
‘self in our teaching, experience and background therefore shape our practice” (1991, p.
144). I would go even further to say, that we can only teach out of who we are, and the
level of investment simply becomes one aspect of who we are. Practice is always generated
out o f our own theoretical constructs. All teachers, all students have a philosophy of
education by virtue of their experiences o f education. This is so regardless of their level of
awareness of a personal philosophy. Our actions in educational settings reflect our
educational philosophy. Whitehead says that “the philosophic process ... should have
received some attention from every educated mind” (1938, p. 3). One way to begin
investigating our own philosophy is by examining our practice.
If our philosophy, theories, and the metaphors that shape our beliefs about the world
are incongruent, our practice will be incongruent also. Continuity of experience helps
develop congruence —an agreement between what we do and what we think or believe.
When there is a difference between our theories and our actions, cognitive dissonance
develops. This is an internal conflict which occurs with incongruence. Cognitive dissonance
can occur with the incongruence between our theories and actions. The dissonance caused
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by the gap between our beliefs and actions is usually reduced by unconsciously altering
thinking to conform to actions. However, “reducing dissonance without clearly examining
the compromise it requires can lead people to abandon beliefs that are important to their
self-esteem” (Green and Sanford, 1983, p. 394). A typical example is when a teacher looses
his or her temper in the classroom. Yelling, screaming, or otherwise verbally abusing a
student is never appropriate but happens often. For a competent teacher such behavior
represents a gap between what the teacher does and what the teacher believes. However,
this inappropriate behavior is often blamed on the students, or justified as being needed on
occasion to teach the students exactly who is in charge. Such rationalizations reduce
cognitive dissonance, but also compromise beliefs about the nature of the responsibility of
the teacher to act in appropriate ways even when students do not. It is a shift from
democracy to authoritarianism.
Cognitive dissonance can also arise with the presentation of ideas that are new. It
can arise through the use of vehicles such as parables and metaphoric stories, that elude
reduction to a single meaning. However, cognitive dissonance can also be an avenue for
change and a way to deepen our understanding of ourselves. The dissonance arising from
the presentation of new ideas can become fertile ground for cultivation rather than simply
as place from which to escape by rejecting or ignoring the confusion o f the new. The
dissonance generated by the gap between our beliefs and practice can also alert us to the
need to examine what we are doing. We are called to examine, carefully examine our
theories and our practices. But this takes courage.
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If we, in general, believe in democracy but are only able to act on that belief in
instances when we feel confident, it is evident that we believe something different pertains
when confidence is lacking. Even when we want to act democratically, if feelings of
insecurity emerge, it is difficult to do so. And as Dewey says, “insecurity generates the quest
for certainty,” (1929/1979, p. 254) a desire for control. Parker Palmer tells us, “When our
fears as teachers mingle and multiply with the fears inside our students, teaching and
learning become mechanical, manipulative, lifeless” (1990, p. 16). Feelings and emotions
cannot be left unexamined any more than theories can. For “emotions in human affairs may
easily, and regrettably, outweigh the influence of logical structures,” (Fernandez, 1986, p.
8). It is regrettable because emotions are difficult to control and are often even less closely
examined than ideas. Fernandez also says that there is a “resistance to the study of metaphor
[which] arises from the fact that metaphor has so much to do with feelings” (1986, p. 7).
As one of my counselees7 recently said, “Metaphors are out o f our control because we can
neither predict nor control how others will interpret the metaphors we use.” And they
sometimes take us places we do not wish to go. It takes courage to examine emotions and
cope with the uncertainties of metaphor.
Since we teach out of who we are, our beliefs about the world, there is a recurring
need to think about who we are, who we are becoming, what we are doing. Dewey says that
“thinking ... is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something
which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous”
(1916/1966, p. 145). Thinking, when applied to teaching or as an endeavor to understand
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ourselves, our feelings and actions, needs to be engaged at a reflective level whereby
connections between our thinking and our doing lead to integration. “Good teaching cannot
be equated with technique. It comes from the integrity of the teacher” (Palmer, 1990, p. 11).
Integrity is the internal congruence, undividedness within, directing our activities in ways
that promote growth. Integrity takes courage. C. S. Lewis says that, “Courage is not simply
one o f the virtues, but the form of every virtue at the testing point .... Honesty or mercy
which yields to danger will be ... honest or merciful only on conditions. Pilate was merciful
until it became risky” (1961 p. 137-138). Teaching is risky. It is risky in general; it is risky
in particular. The import of every action is only a matter o f degree. And teaching is no less
an educative or miseducative experience for the teacher than it is for the student.
Whitehead says that “the use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of
fundamental ideas illuminating the social systems. It reverses the slow descent of accepted
thought towards the inactive commonplace” (1938, p. 237) whereby our ideas become
routine, habituated and unexamined. But in order for our philosophy to be active and
illuminating, we must think and reflect. The act of reflection is an act of responsibility
because “reflection is the acceptance o f ... responsibility for the future consequences which
flow from present action” (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 146). Philosophical reflection helps us
discover and become who we are, which in turn allows us to make better informed choices
in directing our future.
Where do we begin? We begin with metaphor. We do so in part because as
Whitehead says, “Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when philosophic thought
has done its best, the wonder remains” (1938, p. 232). Metaphors participate in wonder, not
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certainty. This is perhaps better understood within the context that Dewey says thinking
occurs. “Where there is reflection there is suspense. ... thinking is a process of inquiry, of
looking into things, of investigation. ... It is seeking, a quest for something that is not at
hand” (1916/1966, p. 148). We reflect to make connections, to gain knowledge for directing
action and further inquiry not to find certainty because “all thinking involves a risk” (p.
148). Yet the willingness to risk is often in conflict with our desire for control. Reflecting,
thinking, teaching all require courage. Courage is enlarged by integrity. And integrity is
deepened through further reflection.
We begin with metaphor because theories are rooted in metaphor. To better
understand ourselves, to gain insights into our philosophies, we begin by discerning the
metaphors out of which they emerge. What do we mean when we speak of a classroom
environment? In Chapter Five I only touched on the metaphors ecology and ecosystem. Sir
Arthur George Tansely coined the term ecosystem to stress the concept of interdependence.
“There is constant interchange ... within each system, not only between the organisms but
between the organic and inorganic. These ecosystems, as we may call them, are of the most
various kinds and sizes. They form one category o f the multitudinous physical systems of
the universe” (OED, 1987, p. 227). Each locale or habitat of plant or animal life is an
ecosystem. Social systems can also be viewed as ecologies or ecosystems (Bateson, 1972;
Berry, 1986). An understanding o f the complexity of relationships constituting the social
system o f a classroom can be deepened through an ecological metaphor (Bowers and
Flinders, 1990). Ecosystems are dynamic, the populations that constitute them are always
in the process o f change. Interdependence means that the growth and development o f the
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is connected to the growth and development of the members, which is connected to the
growth and development of the system as a whole. However, for growth to take place at
all these levels, i.e. the system as a whole fostering growth in individual members and
individuals fostering growth in one another and in the system as a whole, a basis of
cooperation is required. The cooperation is both for enlarging the significance o f the whole
system and the enlarging o f the individuals. Wendell Berry says that, “The definitive
relationships in the universe are ... not competitive but interdependent” (1986, p. 47).
Competition in the classroom is not totally eliminated, rather it is internalized so that the
participants compete with themselves rather than against one another. Cooperation with
rather than competition against can create a safe environment whereby the ecosystem
becomes a growth community —another metaphor.
One o f the difficulties of employing the ecology metaphor is in the nature o f the
interrelationships, the interconnections that exist in a classroom. Some are visible, some are
not. It is like the Mandelbrot set, which the reader will recall is black. Everything inside the
set is black and all other colors are outside the set. Yet, when we zoom in on an edge, often
we see only a small speck of black, another fish, which seemed unconnected and completely
surrounded by colors. However, it is tied to the whole set, the original fish, by a thread so
fine that it is not visible even with tremendous degrees of magnification. We know, as in the
ecosystem system, that the connections are there for without them there would be no fish
beyond the first few magnifications. If, in the classroom, we ignore the connections, we will
see only a few static images and very little complexity.
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Yet, because metaphors have so much to do with emotions, we must be cautious.
As teachers, we are responsible for setting up an environment of growth. In order to help
pre-service teachers, in what is usually their first undergraduate education course,
understand their educational philosophies —to find, choose and develop the metaphors that
they want as guides —1 begin with a physical metaphor. I ask the students to change the
linear arrangement of desks into a circle. It is simple, yet remarkably powerful. Student
responses have sometimes been surprisingly strong but consistent with the notion of
interdependence. Particularly in classes where none of the students have experienced circular
seating, there is often resistance and discomfort with the change. Other classes are eager to
break out o f the rows where they looked at the back of heads instead of faces, never
realizing a classroom could be a community. For a few students, this pattern is already
familiar.
One class was uncomfortable with the circle, yet they did not want simply to return
to traditional rows. They decided to divide the room into two sections facing each other,
like a monastic choir. They said that this way they had less of a sense of vulnerability that
the circle engendered and were able the see the faces of half their classmates. They openly
engaged the emotions the circular pattern stirred and intentionally made a compromise that
met their needs at the time. And one very small class of only twelve students (the others had
thirty-five or more), completely resisted forming a circle. They isolated themselves among
the mostly empty desks in the room, with few students sitting next to another, and stated
flatly that they did not feel comfortable in a circle.
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Reflection on the varied responses to what seems like an overly simple metaphor
leads me to a metaphoric story told by the ancient Chinese philosopher Chuang Tzu and
recounted by Thomas Merton (1963). The story goes like this: Once a seabird was blown
inshore and landed outside the capital o f Lu. The Prince ordered a splendid reception with
wine and beef. He ordered musicians to play. But dazed with symphonies, the unhappy sea
bird died of despair. Chuang Tzu asks, “How should you treat a bird? As yourself or as a
bird? Ought not a bird to nest in deep woodland or fly over meadow and marsh? Ought it
not to swim on river and pond, feed on eels and fish, fly in formation with other waterfowl,
and rest in the reeds? Bad enough for a sea bird to be surrounded by men and frightened by
their voices! That was not enough! They killed it with music! ... Water is for fish and air for
men. Natures differ, and needs with them. Hence the wise men o f old did not lay down one
measure for all” (Merton, 1963, p. 103-104).
What constitutes one measure for all? Must students sit in a circle to learn new ways
of thinking? How can I take each student’s nature into account? The research of Brophy and
Good echoes “the wise men of old” in their discovery that “what constitutes effective
instruction ... varies with context. What appears to be just the right amount of
demandingness (or structuring o f content, or praise, etc.) for one class might be too much
for a second class but not enough for a third class (1986, p. 370) and it varies even within
a class as subject, group size, and specific objectives change.
There are no simple answers. I think; 1 reflect; I move to the next metaphor. Usually
by the fourth day o f class, the students are experiencing varying degrees of confusion, in
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part because my approach is non-linear and for most students this represents a change.8 1
have the students break into small groups and generate a metaphor that expresses their
feelings-abcmt being in this class. I tell them, that I am aware that students often find this
class different from what they had expected and whatever they are experiencing is okay.
They are asked not to generate “flattering” metaphors to please me but ones that convey for
them, their own experiences. All the classes have responded well to this process. At this
point in the course, they seem relieved to be able to express to one another what they are
experiencing and excited by the discovery that other students share their confusion.
Generating a metaphor to describe their experience can do several things. Because
they are engaging in the communal generation of metaphors, a sense of community emerges.
It is communal because it is about their common experience not simply a group activity. It
also helps develop a safer context for later explorations o f themselves and new ideas,
because that is the very process in which they are engaged. It is safe because all the students
share in a sense o f discomfort to some degree.
The metaphors the students generate tend to be repeated in each new class. Most
of them focus on a sense o f confusion or frustration. The most frequent metaphor is being
in a foreign country and not knowing the language. This metaphor exposes a communication
problem. However, the country is recognized as foreign, not alien, and learning a language
is part o f their educational experience. They say this as a metaphor with expectations for

A student, in the small class that would not sit in a circle, complained to me that she was
accustomed to going to class, taking lecture notes, and being told what to study for the test
and that that was the way she liked it. She assured me that no teacher in the past had ever
asked her to think.
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success. Another recurring metaphor is a tunnel with a light seen at the end. Again there is
expectation of success though the territory may not be as pleasant. Other groups see
themselves in a maze. They hope, but are not always sure, they will find a way out. Some
of these students talk about frustration as well as confusion. And one group likened the class
to learning to swim. These students had all accomplished that goal and still remembered the
struggles and difficulties they encountered. They seemed to exhibit the greatest confidence
in success by linking the present challenge with a past achievement.
Once the metaphors are generated, each group shares their metaphors with the rest
of the class. They discuss their thoughts and ideas about their own metaphor and those of
others. I assure them that their discomfort is a natural part o f the process. Indeed their
confusion can be viewed as evidence of participation in thinking in new ways. This provides
relief to concerned students who primarily connect confusion with inattention and/or lack
of participation. It also affords an easy entry into the investigation of thought processes such
as Piaget’s concept o f disequilibrium (1977) and Dewey’s ideas on reflection because the
students now have conscious, lived experience with which to connect these ideas. The ideas
and experiences of metaphors and reflective thinking lead into the development of the
student’s own metaphors for their own ideas about teaching.
It is a natural transition to move from metaphor to narrative. “To talk o f metaphor
is to talk of tropes.... Tropes always define a relationship between terms. Tropes are about
relationships, never about a term taken by itself’ (Sapir, 1977, p. 3). Metaphors establish
a certain kind of relationship and narrative can relate the form of action the relationships
take. Rosen says that “to tell a story is to formulate an interlocking set of meanings; to listen
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to one is in its turn an active search for the teller’s meaning via one’s own; to retell a story
is also to do just that because listening is a kind o f retelling” (Rosen, 1986). Rosen’s point
brings out the recursive nature of narrative.
Richard Hopkins in his Preface to Narrative Schooling, says that narrative relates to
the essential concerns of education — “words, representations, ideas, forms, structures,
quantities, qualities, and judgments. It is, among other things, an exercise in critical thinking.
Our narratives are the means through which we imagine ourselves into the persons we
become” (1994, p. xvii, emphasis added). What could be more important for the process of
becoming a teacher; what could be more important for our students? Hopkins suggests
narrative as a new root metaphor for American education. This is a root metaphor with
possibilities for changing, re-framing our entire understanding o f the educational process by
reinterpreting our understanding of ourselves. As long as the machine metaphor undergirds
the educational structure, education will be about what rather than who students and
teachers are. The implication is clear when Hannah Arendt (1959) says that when we know
someone’s story, we know who they are or were. Without the story, we only know what
and it is the who that makes us human. Frankl bemoans the loss attendant to our change in
interpretation. He says, "man, as long as he regarded himself as a creature, interpreted his
existence in the image of God, his creator [with infinite possibility]; but as soon as he started
considering himself as a creator, began to interpret his existence merely in the image of his
own creation, the machine" (1988, p. 16).
Finally, narrative leads us to the concept of framing and re-framing, the idea of how
we conceptualize any event, situation or context —our interpretations and re-interpretations,
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our constructions and reconstructions. The metaphors we use in our narratives tell us how
we view a situation. Our frames exhibit our theories. If we use battle-field terminology when
we describe a classroom experience, we are using war as a frame. Donald Schon has
described this idea for over a decade and across many disciplines (1983, 1987, 1991; Schon
and Rein, 1994). One comparison of frames he uses comes out of views of urban housing
from the 1950s. One story calls it blight and the other a natural community. He says that
“these are powerful stories, powerful in the sense that they have shaped public
consciousness about the issues of housing. Each story conveys a very different view of
reality, and represents a special way of seeing” (1993, p. 146). Through what he calls
generative metaphors, “each story constructs a view of social reality through ... naming and
framing‘s which is like Dewey’s idea o f problem-setting (1938). By naming the condition
“urban blight”, a disease metaphor is invoked whereby a cure is called for. The other story
calls the same area a “natural community” evoking human relationships as a metaphoric
basis where preservation becomes important. Bowers reminds us of the “power o f language
to enforce conceptual habits, even when the conceptual habits are contradicted by the force
of everyday experience” (1987, p. 75).
How can we re-frame the educational process? How do we understand and deal with
the concept o f the interplay o f law and determinism generating life? Dewey talks about it
this way:
Contingency is a necessary although n o t... a sufficient condition of freedom.
In a world which was completely tight and exact in all its constituents, there
would be no room for freedom. Contingency while it gives room for
freedom does not fill that room. Freedom is an actuality when the
recognition of relations, the stable element, is combined with the uncertain
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element, in the knowledge which makes foresight possible and secures
intentional preparation for probable consequences. We are free in the degree
in which we act knowing what we are about. (1929/1979, p. 249-250)
How can we reconstruct educational experience? What metaphors can we intentionally
choose to re-form our conceptual habits? What is there to do so we may believe in schools
as places for the encouragement of growth and limitless possibilities, rather than as factories
that replicate machines? We must be willing to think, but “all thinking involves risk”
(Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 148). Do we have the courage to return to the roots of philosophy —
personal philosophy, educational philosophy —which Dewey says is a return “to the old
saying that philosophy is love o f wisdom, o f wisdom which is not knowledge and which
nevertheless cannot be without knowledge” (1929/1958, p. 409)?

CHAPTER SEVEN
BOTH/AND
The evils which we suffer in education ... the whole separation of knowledge
and practice-all testify to the necessity of seeing mind-body as an integral
whole.... When we take the standpoint of action we may still treat some
functions as primarily physical and others as primarily mental.... Yet if we
are wise we shall not regard the difference as other than one o f degree and
emphasis. (Dewey, 1931, p. 302-302)

This concluding chapter unites specific examples of educational practice with the
ideas and concepts explored throughout the preceding chapters. The illustrations come from
several sources including the experiences of other teachers as well as my own. The examples
will be connected to specific key ideas previously presented, often using previous quotations
as threads of continuity. A careful reading will reveal that the headings I use to emphasize
particular concepts could be used interchangeably for almost all examples. In other words,
because o f the nature o f the non-dualistic approach, there is a recursive, interconnected,
self-similar aspect whereby the examples could be used under almost any of the headings.
I use headings to focus on a particular idea and to draw the reader’s attention to the
interrelationships among the examples.
NON-DUALISM, OR BEYOND EITHER/OR THINKING
In the Introduction, I stated that non-dualism was the cornerstone of the world view
that forms the foundation of this dissertation. How does one help students experience nondualistic ways o f thinking they have not yet encountered or thought about? In linear,
modernist methodology, one would simply tell them directly. However, when one wants
students to understand the importance of the indirect, other methods are needed; they must
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experience in order to have “knowledge o f ’ rather than just “knowledge about” (Spinoza,
1670/1985). A linear method would effectively nullify the very thing being taught —the
indirect, the non-linear.
The narrative and indeterminate or paradoxical thread o f Oriental origin that entered
Western thought through Christianity’s Judaic roots has be hidden from view through much
of Occidental history. Here again, by paradox I mean the concept o f holding opposites in
tension rather than viewing them as contradictory. One way to re-weave that thread is
through the use of Eastern stories exemplifying those concepts.
There is an ancient Chinese story about an old farmer whose only horse ran away.
His neighbor came to console him saying, “Bad luck.” But the old man merely replied,
“Who can say what is good luck or bad?”
The next day the farmer’s horse returned, bringing ten wild horses with it. The
neighbor came by to congratulate the farmer for his good luck. The farmer again replied,
“Who can say what is good or bad?”
On the third day, the farmer’s son mounted one o f the wild horses to break it.
Instead, he was thrown and his leg was broken. Upon hearing o f the son’s accident, the
neighbor came to share in the farmer’s sadness. But again the farmer asked, “Who knows
what is good or bad?”
On the fourth day, the army came through the area conscripting all the young men
into military service. Upon seeing the son’s broken leg, they exempted him. The neighbor,
hearing the news, wanted to share in the gladness. But the farmer, in his consistent wisdom,
again replied, “Who can say what is good or bad?”
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I have used this story with high school students as a means by which to introduce
both/and thinking and to help expand their ability to reflect. In preparation, the students
engage in reflective thinking through the process o f weekly journal entries in which they
reflect on experiences that are meaningful for them. After telling the story, I ask them to
comment on it. Some students say, ‘I t ’s a stupid story; of course we can know if something
is good or bad. The horse running away was bad and its coming back with more was good.”
Other students see more to the story. Some reflect extensively on it, saying that it resonates
on a deeper level for them. “Partial conclusions emerge during the course of reflection”
(Dewey, 1933/1971, p. 75). The reflective students make comments such as, “Well, it’s not
just good luck or bad luck. It’s how you look at it. And there’s more than one way to see
it.” Others say, “It’s like the events all sort of flow together. You can’t really say that it’s
good or bad until the next thing happens, and then you can’t say it’s either ... and it gets
kind of confused.” Partial conclusions begin to emerge. The idea that understanding things
in simple either/or terms begins to blur. Some students connect easily with this story, some
don’t like it, others just feel confused. The discussion comes from thoughts and ideas
generated by the students; I give no explanation. But all have been presented with an
alternative way of understanding. Is it educative for all of them? Is anything educative for
all? Who can say?
One student was particularly struck by the sense of freedom he experienced in
thinking about the story. He said he felt free to see things no longer as just good or bad. He
also came to an understanding of how important context is. That the story had a lasting
impact was made evident throughout the year as this student, from time to time, would
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recognize paradoxical elements in something occurring in class and inteiject, “Who can
say?” as a way to draw us back to the ideas we struggled with in that story.
This story serves as a metaphor as well. It isn’t just a story about the man and his
neighbor. In its complex simplicity, it functions as a metaphor in Vaught’s terms, “an
intersection of indeterminacy and determination” (1987, p. 228).
A second example that relates both to the concept of non-dualism and metaphor is
connected to ideas in Chapter Three. There we saw that the ideas o f Descartes, Bacon and
Newton led to major changes in scientific thought. Dewey says this became a reversal of the
“methods of the ancients [who based] their conclusions about knowledge on the nature of
universe in which knowledge occurs” (1929, p. 41). The new method was to “arrive at
theories regarding the nature of the universe by means of theories regarding the nature of
knowledge” (p. 41). But knowledge, like mind has become “a separate, isolated quality,
removed form the experiences and wisdom of life” (Doll, 1993, p. 113). With the separation
o f knowledge from life experience, a gap slowly opened between lived experience and
nature. Today this gap is a chasm so wide that the equation o f humans with machines is
taken for granted.
Students live in a world dominated by more and more complex and sophisticated
machines. In an effort to help students connect their own experiences to the natural physical
universe in which we all live, rather than remaining in the technological realm where they
spend so much o f their time, I had them write a story. I brought a basket of small rocks to
class and spoke briefly about the formation of rocks and how old these rocks must be. I
recounted that according to the Big Bang theory, all matter in the universe comes from a
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class and spoke briefly about the formation o f rocks and how old these rocks must be. I
recounted that according to the Big Bang theory, all matter in the universe comes from a
common source; therefore, we are, in some way, related to the entire physical universe
(Swimme and Berry, 1992).
Next, I said that each rock had its own story. Each had each existed somewhere for
thousands of years, before ending up in that basket. What story did each rock have to tell?
I selected several rocks and told partial stories, usually based on some physical characteristic
of the rock that suggested itself to me. The students then selected a rock from the basket
and were asked to listen to the rock’s story and write it down.
The responses or reactions to the assignment were as varied as the students. One
senior, who was very literal minded, said the assignment was “The stupidest thing I ever
heard.” 1 agreed that the assignment was unusual, but surely the rock must have a history.
Where could it have come from? What had it seen or done during all those centuries? What
could she imagine about it? She wrote a very good story that revealed quite a lot about
herself. All the stories were, o f course, really about the students themselves in some way.
Each ‘rock story’ was a metaphor for some aspect of their life ~ an interest, a concern, an
attitude about something, some strong emotion. It served to connect them with a larger
physical world as well as aspects of themselves. Even though they did not completely
understand, they were intrigued with what they experienced. On the following day, students
who had been absent found out about the stories from their friends and came to me to get
a rock so they too could write a story. Never had I had high school students insist upon
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making up work they missed. They knew about what had occurred and they wanted to
experience what it was.
A final example of getting beyond either/or thinking has to do with the concept of
viewing something as either a success or a failure. Students, no less than teachers view
grades as marks of success or failure. As teachers, we tend to grade our actions in the
classroom as either pass or fail. Non-dualistic thinking opens up the possibility for us to do
what Frankl suggests and “turn the negative into something positive, tragedy into a triumph,
a predicament into an achievement on the human level” (1988, p. 137). Reflecting on one
of my first teaching experiences allowed me to do just that. An experience that could have
been viewed only as a failure and thereby remained one, was reconstructed as an educative
experience for me.
Our attitudes are intimately connected to our emotional state. We have a general life
attitude, but that attitude can be disrupted by everyday events. Whatever our attitude is at
the moment is the one we take into the classroom. As addressed in Chapter Five, insecurity
can impact our attitude.
My first formal teaching experience was as a graduate student in Marriage and
Family Counseling. I was in my mid-thirties and very eager to be helpfid. The course I
taught was basic academic skills to under-prepared freshmen. Under-prepared meant that
their ACT composite score was below 15. These students were considered under motivated
and poorly prepared for college level work. I taught two sections o f this course.
The first week went well. I developed a good rapport with the students, particularly
the Monday/Wednesday/Friday section. However, during the second week something
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unexpected happened. 1 prepared a lecture on motivation. This was an important topic for
under motivated students and would be quite good for them. I walked across campus to my
Wednesday class prepared to give them just what they needed.
The class began as usual —roll, a little conversation, notebooks and pens out for the
lecture. However, about ten minutes into the lecture, I noticed a change in the students but
didn’t quite know what it was. I continued the lecture. After twenty minutes, their reaction
had become palpable; I could almost hear their minds slamming shut. I hurriedly concluded
the lecture and dismissed class ten minutes early. I felt devastated! And 1 didn’t know why.
As I walked across campus to my office, I reflected on what had happened. Had I
simply imagined a change? No, the reaction was virtually unanimous. Even the most
attentive students has closed themselves. I could blame the students if it had only been a
few, or even half No, the problem was not the students. Then surely it was the lecture. No,
closer examination showed the lecture to be adequate. What then was the problem? At this
point, I asked myself, “ What had 1 hoped to accomplish and how I had expected to do so?”
I was horrified with my answer. My reflection revealed that 1 had taken an attitude that was
incongruent with my beliefs. In my attempt to ignore my insecurity of being a new teacher,
I adopted a desire for certainty, control. I decidedfo r the students exactly what they needed
to know and they were going to get it whether they wanted it or not. I would open their
minds and pour it in. Thankfully, their response was a resounding NO!
Fortunately, I had the Thursday section the following day. I decided to present the
same lecture with a changed attitude. I still believed that the ideas in the lecture were
important for them, but realized that I had no right to impose that belief. My responsibility
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as a teacher was to offer material I thought important and allow them to choose their own
responses. Indeed, they would make their own choice anyway, but if I imposed my will, then
they had something else to deal with, something beyond the subject at hand. In other words,
my attitude could be a miseducative side-track for them. The Thursday section responded
quite differently. Some students were very attentive, others moderately so, and a few, as
usual, seemed completely disinterested. They were clearly making choices about the lecture
rather than an attitude being imposed upon them.
NON-LINEAR
In his syndicated comic strip “The Family Circus,” Bill Keane created a metaphor
representing linear, modernist education (July 9, 1995). The strip is not deeply profound,
simply a mirror of common experience, a part of the pictorial narrative tapestry of American
life. This particular cartoon consists of a single frame drawing o f a park bisected by a paved
path. The two central characters are Billy, a first grader, and his grandmother. They are both
standing in the foreground at the end of the path. Behind them are dotted lines that indicate
the way each traveled from the entrance to arrive at the same spot. The grandmother’s bold
dotted line is straight. Billy’s smaller dotted line encounters nearly everyone and everything
in the park. He climbed trees, examined objects, spoke to and played with people and
animals; his crossing of the space between the gate and the end of the path reveals quite a
different experience from that o f his grandmother. The grandmother, with one arm out in
admonition says, “I walked straight from the gate to here, Billy, but you wandered all over
the place. Now what does that teach you?” Billy replies, “Not to miss out on all the best
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things!” That is hardly the lesson the grandmother, a metaphor for modernist, linear
teaching, wanted Billy to learn.
Dewey’s notion of life as an educational process, evidenced by both the
grandmother’s question and Billy’s reply, considers every happening in life as a learning
experience o f some kind. Had their outing been a geometry class, the grandmother’s
demonstration of the shortest distance between two points as a straight line, would have
been appropriate. However, Billy, understanding the educational context as a park,
embraced the sundry experiences available.
Dewey says, “Perhaps the greatest o f all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a
person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time” (1938/1963, p. 48). I turn
to another grandmother as a more suitable model of teaching. A friend recounted a story
from her childhood. Her grandmother was unraveling tangled embroidery thread and asked
Carol to help. Carol protested, saying the thread only cost a few cents per skein so it should
be thrown away and more purchased. Her grandmother’s reply was, “How then, will you
learn patience?” How indeed? What concepts do we fail to learn in a disposable, linear
society where direct methods are privileged? What are the “best things” Billy did not want
to miss out on?
Many important aspects of life, for instance patience and wisdom, are learned
indirectly, as by-products o f other activities. Dependence on direct methods alone is like
embroidering our history across a piece o f cloth. Embroidery stitches a picture on the
surface of existing fabric. Tapestry, on the other hand, is both an indirect and integrated
process. It is indirect by being woven from the back and integrated inasmuch as the picture
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and the fabric are one. Education as an aspect of our life tapestry should be examined both
from the back where it is woven and from the front where the picture is revealed —not
exclusively one or the other.
Another, more direct example of the educational fallacy noted by Dewey was
experienced by some of my students who were pre-service teachers. They spent an hour
each week during the semester observing an elementary classroom and reported on their
experiences. During a class discussion on their observations, several students who had
watched the same fourth grade class, mentioned the teacher’s primary method o f discipline.
She turned off the lights when the students became noisy, waited until they were quiet, then
resumed the lesson. When the noise level rose again, she repeated the process. During the
forty minutes the students observed, the teacher repeated the process numerous times. At
the beginning of our debriefing, when asked what they thought the students had learned, the
pre-service teachers gave standard comments about the English lesson. However, after
discussing the observation in greater detail, they concluded that perhaps what the students
had learned most thoroughly was how many times they could get the teacher to turn the
lights on and off —or, how to manipulate authority figures.
As seen in Chapter Five, one aspect of the non-linear is the element of
unpredictability; answers are generated by participation in the process, not in advance. The
Mandelbrot set is produced by solving a simple equation and then using the answer as the
next value for X to solve it again. It is only by solving the equation again that the next value
of X is known. It cannot be predicted in advance. The pre-service teachers had originally
applied a linear formula, something Dewey says is a great pedagogical fallacy, by assuming
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that what was primarily being learned was the subject being taught. However, through
participating in discussion and reflection on various aspects o f what they observed, the pre
service teachers discovered something both unexpected and unpredictable.
METAPHORS
Chapters Three, Four and Five treated metaphor in various ways. Metaphors can
be fairly simple or direct when used primarily to explain a single concept. However, what
Gadamar (1989) calls the “metaphoricity of language” is a more complex notion. Inherent
in the concept of the metaphoricity of language is the way metaphor goes beyond either/or
thinking. Metaphors cannot be reduced to either one thing or another and continue as
metaphors. We saw this with the machine metaphor for humans. When reduced to an
equation, an identity —the human machine —machine loses its metaphoricity. Metaphors
are also non-linear in that all the possible connections that someone might make cannot be
predicted. This is especially true with more complex metaphors, particularly metaphoric
stories and parables. With re-readings and additional reflections, the story can generate new
connections, further possibilities in the same reader.
A lower school religion teacher wanted to talk to the fifth grade about the use of
inappropriate language. He had in mind primarily words considered profane or obscene. The
metaphor he generated to help the students understand the concept o f why such words were
inappropriate was “word litter.” He began by asking the group, “What is litter?” Their ideas
began with trash on the side of the road and expanded to encompass everything that harmed
the environment. They ended with toxic waste. After the students explained their ideas, the
teacher asked them, “What do you think ‘word litter’ would be?” Immediately they made
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the connection. These fifth graders notice litter and detest it. Their responses were exciting.
The students asserted that word litter would include “dirty” words, “swear” words, and
“curse” words because they make the social environment ugly like litter defaces the physical
environment. One student said that it would also include name calling and other kinds of
hurtful words. Then connections were made between the harming of the environment and
the harming o f others. They maintained that some words are toxic inasmuch as they hurt
people as badly as toxic waste hurts the environment. Not only did the students understand
the metaphor the teacher used, they generated another metaphor that nuanced greater
degrees of consequences.
Why did this metaphor work so well? Dewey says “the work o f projecting
hypotheses for the education and conduct of mind, individual and social, is subjected to the
test by the way in which the ideas it propounds work out in practice” (1910, p. 18). My
hypothesis here is metaphors have strong educational implications; they are essential in
bridging the gap between the familiar and the unfamiliar. Dewey also maintains that the
educational task which continually confronts us is “to establish working connections
between old and new subject-matters. We cannot lay hold of the new, we cannot even keep
it before our minds, much less understand it, save by the use of ideas and knowledge we
already posses” (1929/1958, p. vii-ix). Donald Oliver, in making a "distinction between
grounded knowing and technical knowing," (1990, p. 64) addresses the significance of the
gap using different language. Technical knowing is simply having facts about something,
whereas, grounded knowing, what Dewey means by understanding, connects experience
with those facts. Eventually, if all we possess is technical knowing, the gap will emerge. This
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will be followed by gaps in our practices. For instance, if we lack grounded knowledge,
occasions will arise when we do not know how or where to apply the technical knowledge.
Children who are only told that some words are “bad,” but lack an understanding of why,
also lack the knowledge o f when, if ever, it is appropriate to use them. This concept is
equally true for broadening and/or deepening subject-matters. If all we have is a list of “bad”
words, without a grounded understanding of the consequences of using those words, we
have no way of including any additional words to the list.
Dewey says that “the greater the gap, the greater the disparity between what has
become a familiar possession and the traits presented in new subject-matter, the greater is
the burden imposed upon reflection; the distance between old and new is the measure of the
range and depth of the thought required” (1929/1958, p. ix). By beginning with the familiar
concept of litter before moving to the new ideas connected with the metaphor “word litter”
the teacher made sure the gap was not too wide. Evidence of the students’ reflection is the
additional metaphor they generated —toxic waste. The range and depth of thoughts and
connections that were involved in the process can be uncovered upon examination. Through
the use o f metaphor to connect old idea with new ones, the students easily bridged what
could have been an enormous gap between litter and hurt feelings. The metaphor also
allowed for the transition from technical knowing to grounded knowing. Telling students
that certain words are inappropriate is “technical”; their telling the teacher why some words
are toxic is “grounded” in their own experiences. They are now prepared to specify both
which words they consider “litter” or “toxic” and the contexts in which such designations
applies. A further example of the children’s deepened understanding occurred when students
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explained the use of the word “hell.” They indicated that it was appropriate to use “hell” in
theological discussions but not appropriate when used to curse someone.
At an international conference on curriculum theory and classroom practice in the
fall of 1995, there were a number of presentations dealing with metaphor. I will discuss two
o f the sessions I attended. The first was the result o f a graduate class assignment. The
students were either practicing teachers or administrators. Their assignment was to write
a paper using a metaphor to express their ideas for curriculum change. Four of the students
presented their papers in the session.
Eric Snead uses the automobile as his metaphor because he is interested in cars. His
paper, “A Developing Curriculum: The Jaguar and the Chevette” connects his ideas about
those two very different types o f automobiles and different kinds of curricula. The major
thrust o f his argument is that Chevettes are cars that are mass produced for utilitarian
purposes and Jaguars are crafted by and for those who truly appreciate fine quality. He sees
the educational process like the production of Chevettes. He says, “Like the assembly of a
Chevrolet, the child’s experience in my school is filled with quality control checks.... We
seem so worried that our students will not meet our minimum standards that we concentrate
all of our energy on measuring that minimum performance ... [in order] to produce a budget
minded, middle class, average performing product” (Snead, 1995, p. 1-2). He continues to
develop his metaphor by comparing the persistent use of the scientific management methods
of the Tyler Rationale that make the educational process like an assembly line.
His comparisons to the building o f the Jaguar are suitable as well, but this is where
a deeper understanding of the use of metaphor is needed. The Jaguar is an automobile

crafted with care and special attention, a product that is expected to demonstrate superior
performance on the road. However, it is still a machine. Comparing and contrasting different
production methods of automobiles is an excellent metaphor for describing the curriculum
as it is. But the changes Snead envisions, ones emerging during discussion o f his paper, are
not mechanistic. However, by using the same root metaphor for how things are and how he
wants them to be, Snead is tied to working with the same order of concepts. To move
beyond mechanistic curricula, one must also move beyond mechanistic metaphors. Dewey’s
call for, “a new order o f conceptions leading to new modes of practice” (1938/1963, p. 5)
can also be understood as a call for new metaphors to express these new order concepts.
This is a call that is just as commonly ignored or misunderstood today as it was in 1938.
William Glasser runs into this same problem with his proposals for educational change in
The Quality School (1990). He advocates a move from boss-management to leadmanagement. Glasser and Snead both end up proposing changes that are simply a matter of
degree. The Jaguar may be special, more carefully crafted than the Chevette, but is an
automobile nonetheless. A benevolent dictator may be preferable to, but is no less a dictator
than is a tyrannical one; it is merely a matter of degree, not kind.
Non-mechanistic metaphors of living systems, such as ecology, immediately shift the
nature of relationships among the curriculum, the student, and the teacher to ones in which
everything exists inside the same system. This conceptual shift is from a closed, mechanistic
system to an open, living system. Mechanistic models are based on closed systems because
machines are closed systems. In mechanistic models, the teacher (or manager) is outside the
system of the students and so is the curriculum. This parallels the fact that workers are not
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part of the products they produce. In other words, workers assemble automobiles, but the
automobiles do not assemble the workers. It is not a reciprocal relationship. On the other
hand, understanding the classroom as an eco-system recognizes that all parts of the system
influence and modify each other. The teacher affects and is affected by the students; the
students are affected by and affect each other and the teacher. In some way, all change and
are changed by everything that occurs. This even includes the curriculum.
The second session I attended on metaphor was conducted by a professor who
regularly has his students generate a metaphor expressing who they perceive themselves to
be as teachers. He uses this exercise with graduate students who are teaching, as well as
undergraduate, pre-service teachers. A major portion of his presentation was having those
in attendance participate in this same exercise.
He issued a sheet with questions for reflection about our approach to teaching —
our mission, intentions, use of authority in the classroom, relationship with students —to
help begin the process of reflecting on our personal theory and practices. In addition, he
gave out a list of over a hundred names o f well known people and characters trom history,
fiction, fantasy, sports and other areas. We were asked to select one or two of the names
that best fit who we see ourselves to be as teachers and be prepared to share the metaphor
with others.
Because I use metaphors often and am interested in the way others use them, 1 found
the exercise helpful. It was helpful in reflections about my teaching practices as well as my
perceptions about myself as a teacher. I gained new insights and I found ideas to build upon
for future teaching experiences. In Chapter Six, I described an exercise 1 use with students
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in which they break into small groups to generate a metaphor to describe their experience
o f being in my class. One o f the benefits of this approach is that the indirectness of
metaphor helps the students feel less vulnerable while at the same time enabling them to
explore their experience at greater depth. The task of generating a metaphor for oneself as
a teacher uses the same principles. Whenever we explore personal perceptions, the need to
proceed at a safe distance is important. A sense of safety is easier to attain when the
metaphor is a well-known person or character. Their fame indicates their characteristics are
publicly known and so shared by the other participants. When I choose a public character,
others know that I am saying certain things about myself indirectly. The fact that others
share an understanding of that person’s characteristics can help them to assist with my
process of reflection. Through discussion of characteristics of my metaphor, similarities and
differences between myself and my metaphorical person emerge. By looking at the famous
person directly and myself indirectly, I don’t feel defensive. I am free to accept or reject any
characteristics associated with my metaphoric character without having to justify or explain
more than I want. In the session, this became a reciprocal process whereby we each gained
insights into our concepts of ourselves as teachers and, through sharing, helped others in
their reflection. It was a communal activity.
This exercise served as the beginning of the reflective process of coming to
understand oneself as a teacher. The metaphors lead to stories about teaching experiences —
one’s own teaching and teachers from the past who had made an impression, for good or
ill, on the storyteller. Possibilities for future activities to expand and deepen the development
of self and others as teacher could proceed from this beginning. By moving from metaphor
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and narrative to fact and logic, one could closely examine the stories and the examples they
contain. Reflection and examination can bring to light consistencies and inconsistencies
between the metaphor and the attendant characteristics we want to embrace. Further inquiry
can help us understand the theory behind our metaphors. We can then ask if that theory is
working in practice. Thus we weave and interweave various modes of thought in and out
for deeper understanding, richer meaning, and greater accuracy.
The reconstruction of philosophy, of education, and o f social ideals and
methods go hand in hand. .. Practical changes cannot take place without
demanding an educational reformation to meet them, and without leading
[us] to ask what ideas and ideals are implicit in these social changes, and
what revisions they require of the ideas and ideals which are inherited from
older and unlike cultures. (Dewey, 1916/1966, p. 331)
The weaving of our life tapestry as an integrated whole means understanding individuals as
distinct, unique members of communities. It means reconstructing the past and integrating
it into the present to point toward future possibilities for growth. Both/and thinking, nonlinearity, and metaphor are concepts and means by which to reconstruct educational
experience. Life, education, democracy, community, becoming fully human are all part of
the reconstructive process. Through metaphors and narratives we gain insights and uncover
meaning in our own stories and those of others so that we and they may become increasingly
human. By reflecting on metaphors, stories, and other experiences, by using facts and logic,
we can examine carefully and precisely the world in which we live. As we gain greater
insights into how to further reconstruct our lives —to better weave our tapestry without
discontinuities and splits —we will also be able to weave strength and integrity for ourselves
and the society in which we live.
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